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We justify and give error estimates for binomial approximations
of game (Israeli) options in the Black–Scholes market with Lips-
chitz continuous path dependent payoffs which are new also for usual
American style options. We show also that rational (optimal) exer-
cise times and hedging self-financing portfolios of binomial approxi-
mations yield for game options in the Black–Scholes market “nearly”
rational exercise times and “nearly” hedging self-financing portfolios
with small average shortfalls and initial capitals close to fair prices
of the options. The estimates rely on strong invariance principle type
approximations via the Skorokhod embedding.
1. Introduction. Cox, Ross and Rubinstein’s (CRR) binomial model of
a financial market was introduced in [6] not only as a simplified discrete
time and space counterpart of the Black–Scholes (BS) model based on the
geometric Brownian motion, but also as a convenient approximation of the
latter which, indeed, became a popular tool to evaluate various derivative
securities. Clearly, for an approximation to have any practical value, it is
necessary to estimate the corresponding error. Many papers dealt with both
justification of the CRR approximation of European and American options
in the BS market and with estimates of the corresponding error terms (see,
e.g., [1, 10, 21, 22, 24, 27, 30]). Still, none of these papers derived error
estimates for options with path dependent payoffs. In this paper we consider
game (Israeli) options introduced in [15] which generalize American style
options when not only their holders but also their writers have the right to
exercise and we obtain error estimates of binomial approximations of fair
prices, rational exercise times and hedging self-financing portfolios for such
options considered in a BS market and having path dependent payoffs.
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A game option (or contingent claim) studied in [15] is a contract between
a writer and a holder at time t= 0 such that both have the right to exercise
at any stopping time before the expiry date T . If the holder exercises at
time t, he may claim the amount Yt ≥ 0 from the writer and if the writer
exercises at time t, he must pay to the holder the amount Xt ≥ Yt so that
δt =Xt−Yt is viewed as a penalty imposed on the writer for cancellation of
the contract. If both exercise at the same time t, then the holder may claim
Yt and if neither have exercised until the expiry time T , then the holder may
claim the amount YT . In short, if the writer will exercise at a stopping time
σ ≤ T and the holder at a stopping time τ ≤ T , then the former pays to the
latter the amount R(σ, τ), where
R(s, t) =XsIs<t + YtIt≤s(1.1)
and we set IA = 1 if (an event or an assertion) A holds true and IA = 0 if
not. As usual, we start with a complete probability space (Ω,F , P ) and a
filtration of σ-algebras {Ft}t≥0 generated either by a Brownian motion in
the BS model or by i.i.d. binomial random variables in the CRR model. The
payoff processes Xt and Yt should be adapted to the corresponding filtration
and in the continuous time case they are supposed to be right continuous
with left limits, though the latter could be relaxed sometimes.
Two popular models of complete markets were considered in [15] for
pricing of game options. First, the discrete time CRR binomial model was
treated there where the stock price Sk at time k is equal to
Sk = S0
k∏
j=1
(1 + ρj), S0 > 0,(1.2)
where ρj , j = 1,2, . . . , are independent identically distributed (i.i.d.) random
variables such that ρj = b > 0 with probability p > 0 and ρj = a < 0, a >−1
with probability q = 1− p > 0. Second, [15] deals with the continuous time
BS market model where the stock price St at time t is given by the geometric
Brownian motion
St = S0 exp((α− κ2/2)t+ κBt), S0 > 0,(1.3)
where {Bt}t≥0 is the standard one-dimensional continuous in time Brownian
motion (Wiener process) starting at zero and κ > 0, α ∈ (−∞,∞) are some
parameters. In addition to the stock which is a risky security, the market
includes in both cases also a savings account with a deterministic growth
given by the formulas
bn = (1+ r)
nb0 and bt = b0e
rt, b0, r > 0,(1.4)
in the CRR model (where we assume, in addition, that r < b) and in the BS
model, respectively.
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Recall (see [28]) that a probability measure describing the evolution of a
stock price in a stochastic financial market is called martingale (risk-neutral)
if the discounted stock prices [(1 + r)−kSk in the CRR model and e−rtSt in
the BS model] become martingales. Relying on hedging arguments, it was
shown in [15] that the fair price V of the game option is given by the formulas
V = min
σ∈T0T
max
τ∈T0T
E((1 + r)−σ∧τR(σ, τ))(1.5)
in the CRR market [with usual notation a∧ b=min(a, b), a∨ b=max(a, b)]
and
V = inf
σ∈T0T
sup
τ∈T0T
E(e−rσ∧τR(σ, τ))(1.6)
in the BS market, where the expectations are taken with respect to the cor-
responding martingale probabilities, which are uniquely defined since these
markets are known to be complete (see [28]), T is the expiry time and Tst
is the space of corresponding stopping times with values between s and t
taking into account that in the CRR model σ and τ are allowed to take
only integer values. Observe that formulas (1.5) and (1.6) represent also
the values of corresponding Dynkin’s (optimal stopping) games with pay-
offs (1 + r)−σ∧τR(σ, τ) and e−rσ∧τR(σ, τ), respectively, when the first and
the second players stop the game at stopping times σ and τ , respectively.
Observe that since their introduction in [15], various aspects of game (Is-
raeli) options were studied in [2, 5, 7, 9, 12, 17, 18, 19, 20] and recently this
technique was applied in [8] to convertible (callable) bonds.
The continuous time BS model is generally considered as a better de-
scription of the evolution of real stocks, in particular, since the CRR model
allows only two possible values (1 + b)Sk and (1 + a)Sk for the stock price
Sk+1 at time k+ 1 given its price Sk at time k. The main advantage of the
CRR model is its simplicity and the possibility of easier computations of
the value V in (1.5), in particular, by means of the dynamical programming
recursive relations (see [15]),
V = V0,N , VN,N = (1+ r)
−NYN and
(1.7)
Vk,N =min((1 + r)
−kXk,max((1 + r)−kYk,E(Vk+1,N |Fk))),
where a positive integer N is an expiry time and {Fk}k≥0 is the correspond-
ing filtration of σ-algebras.
Following [30], we will approximate the BS model by a sequence of CRR
models with the interest rates r= r(n) from (1.4) and with random variables
ρk = ρ
(n)
k from (1.2) given by
r = r(n) = exp(rT/n)− 1 and
(1.8)
ρk = ρ
(n)
k = exp
(
rT
n
+ κ
(
T
n
)1/2
ξk
)
− 1,
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where ξj = ξ
(n)
j , j = 1,2, . . . , are i.i.d. random variables taking on the val-
ues 1 and −1 with probabilities p(n) = (exp(κ
√
T
n ) + 1)
−1 and 1 − p(n) =
(exp(−κ
√
T
n )+1)
−1, respectively. This choice of random variables ξi, i ∈N,
determines already the probability measures P ξn = {p(n),1− p(n)}∞ for the
above sequence of CRR models and since Eξnρ
(n)
k = r
(n), where Eξn is the
expectation with respect to P ξn , we conclude that P
ξ
n is the martingale mea-
sure for the corresponding CRR market and the fair price V = V (n) of a
game option in this market is given by the formula (1.5) with E =Eξn. Some
authors consider a bit simpler and more straightforward approximation (see,
e.g., [21] and [22]) where
ρk = ρˆk = exp
(
βT
n
+ κ
(
T
n
)1/2
ξˆk
)
− 1(1.9)
with β = r − κ2/2 and ξˆk takes on the values 1 and −1 with the same
probability 1/2. This approximation leads to similar errors estimates (with,
essentially, the same proof ) but, in general, we do not arrive at the martin-
gale probability measures in this case. Thus, we have to speak then about
the prices V (n) of discrete time Dynkin’s games (rather than about the fair
prices of the corresponding game options) given by (1.5) for the CRR market
with ρˆk and r
(n) described above, but with the expectation E = E ξˆ taken
with respect to the probability P ξˆ generated by ξˆj , j = 1,2, . . . , rather than
with respect to the corresponding martingale probabilities. For purposes of
approximation, this difference is not so important, but the first approxima-
tion becomes more convenient for the construction of self-financing “nearly”
hedging portfolios with small average shortfalls. Another useful advantage of
the first approximation is that it leads to discounted stock prices evolving on
the multiplicative lattice {S0 exp(mκ(T/n)1/2),m ∈ Z} which substantially
simplifies computations.
Let V be the fair price of the game option in the BS market. The main
goal of this paper is to show that for a certain natural class of payoffs Xt
and Yt which may depend on the whole path (history) of the stock price
evolution (as in integral or Russian type options) the error |V − V (n)| does
not exceed Cn−1/4(lnn)3/4, where C > 0 does not depend on n and it can be
estimated explicitly. Moreover, we will show that the rational exercise times
of our CRR binomial approximations yield near rational [(Cn−1/4(lnn)3/4)-
optimal stopping times for the corresponding Dynkin games] exercise times
for game options in the BS market. Since the values V (n) and the optimal
stopping times of the corresponding discrete time Dynkin’s games can be
obtained directly via the dynamical programming recursive procedure (1.7),
our results provide a justification of a rather effective method of computa-
tion of fair prices and exercise times of game options with path dependent
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payoffs. The standard construction of a self-financing hedging portfolio in-
volves usually the Doob–Meyer decomposition of supermartingales which is
explicit only in the discrete, but not in the continuous time case. We will
show how to construct a self-financing portfolio in the BS market with a
small average (maximal) shortfall and an initial capital close to the fair
price of a game option using hedging self-financing portfolios for the ap-
proximating binomial CRR markets. The latter problem does not seem to
have been addressed until now in the literature on this subject. This hints,
in particular, that since hedging self-financing portfolio strategies can be
computed only approximately, their possible shortfalls come naturally into
the picture and they should be taken into account in option pricing even if a
perfect hedging exists theoretically. Note that the results of the present pa-
per require not only an approximation of stock prices and the corresponding
payoffs, but also we have to take care about the different nature of stopping
times in (1.5) and (1.6). It would be interesting to obtain similar results
for discrete time and space (say, multinomial) approximations of sufficiently
general Le´vy markets, that is, markets where the stock price evolve accord-
ing to a geometric Le´vy process with jumps, but this requires additional
ideas and machinery. Some discrete time approximation results without er-
ror estimates for American options in the Merton stock market model were
obtained in [25]. Game options with jump–diffusion models of stock evolu-
tions were considered recently in [8].
Our main tool is the Skorokhod type embedding of sums of i.i.d. ran-
dom variables into a Brownian motion (with a constant drift, in our case).
This tool was already employed for similar purposes in [24] and [30]. The
first paper treats an optimal stopping problem which can be applied to an
American style option with a payoff function depending only on the cur-
rent stock price and, more importantly, this function must be bounded and
have two bounded derivatives which excludes usual put and call options.
The second paper deals only with European options and, again, only payoffs
(though with some discontinuities) determined by the current stock price
are allowed. A number of other papers also deal with error estimates for
the CRR approximation of European and American option prices in the BS
market (see, e.g., [21, 22, 27] and references there), but none of them treat
path dependent payoffs (moreover, boundedness of payoffs conditions there
usually exclude even American style call options) and none of them consider
the game options case as well.
The main results of this paper are formulated in the next section where we
discuss also the Skorokhod type embedding which we employ in the proof. In
Section 3 we show how this embedding enables us to consider both CRR and
BS stock evolutions in an appropriate way on the same probability space and
we exhibit there a series of steps which lead to the proof of the main results.
The necessary technical estimates are derived in Section 4. In Section 5 we
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deal with rational exercise times and self-financing nearly hedging portfolios
with small averaged shortfalls. In Section 6 we generalize to the game options
situation the estimates from [24], which cannot be applied to the standard
options as the proof relies on very restrictive bondedness and smoothness
assumptions, but still, in view of their simplicity, the arguments there may
have a pedagogical value and some readers may prefer to read this case first.
2. Preliminaries and main results. For each t > 0, denote by M [0, t]
the space of Borel measurable functions on [0, t] with the uniform metric
d0t(υ, υ˜) = sup0≤s≤t |υs − υ˜s|. For each t > 0, let Ft and ∆t be nonnegative
functions on M [0, t] such that, for some constant L≥ 1 and for any t≥ s≥ 0
and υ, υ˜ ∈M [0, t],
|Fs(υ)−Fs(υ˜)|+ |∆s(υ)−∆s(υ˜)| ≤ L(s+1)d0s(υ, υ˜)(2.1)
and
|Ft(υ)−Fs(υ)|+ |∆t(υ)−∆s(υ)|
(2.2)
≤L
(
|t− s|
(
1 + sup
u∈[0,t]
|υu|
)
+ sup
u∈[s,t]
|υu − υs|
)
.
By (2.1), F0(υ) = F0(υ0) and ∆0(υ) = ∆0(υ0) are functions of υ0 only. By
(2.2),
Ft(υ) +∆t(υ)≤ F0(υ0) +∆0(υ0) +L(t+ 2)
(
1 + sup
0≤s≤t
|υs|
)
.(2.3)
Next, we consider the BS market on a complete probability space to-
gether with its martingale measure PB which exists and is unique as a
corollary of the Girsanov theorem (see [28]). Let Bt, t≥ 0, be the standard
one-dimensional continuous in time Brownian motion with respect to the
martingale measure PB . Set
B∗t =−
κ
2
t+Bt, t≥ 0.
Then the stock price SBt (z) at time t in the BS market can be written in
the form
SBt (z) = z exp(rt+ κB
∗
t ), S
B
0 (z) = z > 0,(2.4)
where r > 0 is the interest rate and κ > 0 is the so-called volatility. We will
consider game options in the BS market with payoff processes in the form
Yt = Ft(S
B(z)) and Xt =Gt(S
B(z)), t ∈ [0, T ], T > 0,
where Gt = Ft+∆t, F,∆ satisfy (2.1) and (2.2), S
B(z) = SB(z,ω) ∈M [0, T ]
is a random function taking the value SBt (z) = S
B
t (z,ω) at t ∈ [0, T ], and in
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the notation Ft(S
B(z)), Gt(S
B(z)) for t < T , we take the restriction of SB(z)
to the interval [0, t]. The fair price V = V (z) of this option with an initial
value z > 0 of the stock is given by (1.6).
Next, we consider a sequence of CRR markets on a complete probability
space such that, for each n= 1,2, . . . , the stock prices S
(n)
t (z) at time t are
given by the formula
S
(n)
t (z) = z exp
([nt/T ]∑
k=1
(
rT
n
+ κ
(
T
n
)1/2
ξk
))
, t≥ T/n and
(2.5)
S
(n)
t (z) = S
(n)
0 (z) = z > 0, t ∈ [0, T/n)
where, recall, ξ1, ξ2, . . . are i.i.d. random variables taking the values 1 and −1
with probabilities p(n) = (exp(κ
√
T
n ) + 1)
−1 and 1− p(n) = (exp(−κ
√
T
n ) +
1)−1, respectively. Namely, we consider CRR markets where stock prices
Sm = S
(n)
m/n(z), m= 0,1,2, . . . , satisfy (1.2) with ρk = ρ
n
k given by (1.8) and,
in addition, in place of the interest rate r in the first formula in (1.4),
we take the sequence of interest rates rn = exp(rT/n)− 1, where r is the
interest rate of the BS market appearing in the second formula of (1.4) and
in (1.6). We consider S(n)(z) = S(n)(z,ω) as a random function on [0, T ],
so that S(n)(z,ω) ∈M [0, T ] takes the value S(n)t (z) = S(n)t (z,ω) at t ∈ [0, T ].
For k = 0,1,2, . . . , n, put
Yk = Y
(n)
k (z) = FkT/n(S
(n)(z)) and Xk =X
(n)
k (z) =GkT/n(S
(n)(z)).(2.6)
Then for each n, the fair price V = V (n)(z) of the game option in the cor-
responding CRR market with an initial value z > 0 of the stock is given by
(1.5). Set also
Sˆ
(n)
t (z) = z exp
([nt/T ]∑
k=1
((
r− κ
2
2
)
T
n
+ κ
(
T
n
)1/2
ξˆk
))
, t≥ T/n and
(2.7)
S
(n)
t = S
(n)
0 = z > 0, t ∈ [0, T/n),
where ξˆ1, ξˆ2, . . . are i.i.d. random variables such that ξˆ1 = 1 or ξˆ1 =−1 with
the same probability 1/2 and the corresponding product measure we denote
by P ξˆ .
Set
RBz (s, t) = Ft(S
B(z))Is≥t +Gs(SB(z))Is<t,
(2.8)
QBz (s, t) = e
−rs∧tRBz (s, t),
R(n)z (s, t) = Ft(S
(n)(z))Is≥t +Gs(S(n)(z))Is<t,
(2.9)
Q(n)z (s, t) = e
−rs∧tR(n)z (s, t),
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and let Rˆ
(n)
z (s, t), Qˆ
(n)
z (s, t) be defined by (2.9) with Sˆ(n)(z) in place of
S(n)(z). Denote by T B0T , T ξ0n and T ξˆ0n the sets of stopping times with respect
to the Brownian filtration FBt , t≥ 0, with values in [0, T ] and with respect
to the filtrations Fξk = σ{ξ1, . . . , ξk} and F ξˆk = σ{ξˆ1, . . . , ξˆk}, k = 0,1,2, . . . ,
respectively, with values in {0,1, . . . , n}. Set
V (z) = inf
σ∈T B0T
sup
τ∈T B
0T
EBQBz (σ, τ),(2.10)
V (n)(z) = min
ζ∈T ξ0n
max
η∈T ξ0n
EξnQ
(n)
z
(
ζT
n
,
ηT
n
)
(2.11)
and
Vˆ (n)(z) = min
ζ∈T ξ0n
max
η∈T ξ0n
E ξˆQˆ(n)z
(
ζT
n
,
ηT
n
)
,(2.12)
where EB , Eξn and E
ξˆ are the expectations with respect to the probability
measures PB , P ξn and P
ξˆ , respectively, and we observe that T ξ0n and T ξˆ0n are
finite sets so that we can use min and max in (2.11) and (2.12).
Recall that we choose PB to be the martingale measure for the BS market
and observe that P ξn is the martingale measure for the corresponding CRR
market since a direct computation shows that Eξnρ
(n)
k = rn. Thus, (2.10)
and (2.11) give fair prices of the game options in the corresponding mar-
kets. On the other hand, P ξˆ is not a martingale measure, in general, and
so (2.12) gives the price of the Dynkin game, but not the fair price of the
corresponding game option. We note also that all our formulas involving the
expectations EB , in particular, (2.10) giving the fair price V of a game op-
tion, do not depend on a particular choice of a continuous in time version of
the Brownian motion since all of them induce the same probability measure
on the space of continuous sample paths (see, e.g., Chapter 2 in [29]) which
already determines all expressions with the expectations EB appearing in
this paper.
The following result provides an estimate for the error term in approxi-
mation of the fair price of a game option in the BS market by fair prices of
the sequence of game options and prices of Dynkin’s games defined above.
Theorem 2.1. Suppose that V (z) and V (n)(z) are defined by (2.9)–
(2.12) with functions F and G = F + ∆ satisfying (2.1) and (2.2). Then
there exists a constant C > 0 (which is, essentially, explicitly estimated in
the proof ) such that
max(|V (z)− V (n)(z)|, |V (z)− Vˆ (n)(z)|)
(2.13)
≤C(F0(z) +∆0(z) + z + 1)n−1/4(lnn)3/4
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for all z,n > 0.
The estimates of Theorem 2.1 remain true with, essentially, the same proof
if we define Vˆ (n)(z) by (2.7) and (2.12) with ξˆ1, ξˆ2, . . . being arbitrary i.i.d.
bounded random variables such that Eξˆi = 0 and Eξˆ
2
i = 1. We can choose
more general i.i.d. random variables ξ1, ξ2, . . . appearing in the definition
of V (n), as well, but these generalizations do not seem to have a financial
mathematics motivation since we want to approximate game options in the
BS market by simplest possible models which are, of course, game options
in the CRR market.
Among main examples of options with path-dependent payoff, we have in
mind integral options where
Ft(υ) =
(∫ t
0
fu(υu)du−L
)+
(call option case)
or
Ft(υ) =
(
L−
∫ t
0
fu(υu)du
)+
(put option case),
where, as usual, a+ =max(a,0). The penalty functional may also have here
the integral form
∆t(υ) =
∫ t
0
δu(υu)du.
In order to satisfy conditions (2.1) and (2.2), we can assume that, for some
K > 0 and all x, y, u,
|fu(x)− fu(y)|+ |δu(x)− δu(y)| ≤K|x− y|
and
|fu(x)|+ |δu(x)| ≤K|x|.
Observe also that the Asian type (averaged integral) payoffs of the form
Ft(υ) =
(
1
t
∫ t
0
fu(υu)du−L
)+
or =
(
L− 1
t
∫ t
0
fu(υu)du
)+
do not satisfy condition (2.2) if arbitrarily small exercise times are allowed,
though the latter seems to have only some theoretical interest, as it hardly
happens in reality. Still, also in this case, the binomial approximation errors
can be estimated in a similar way considering separately estimates for small
stopping times and for stopping times bounded away from zero. Namely,
define Vε(z) and V
(n)
ε (z) for ε ≥ 0 by (2.10) and (2.11), where Q(B)z (σ, τ)
and Q
(n)
z (
ζT
n ,
ηT
n ) are replaced by Q
(B)
z (σ∨ ε, τ ∨ ε) and Q(n)z ( ζTn ∨ ε, ηTn ∨ ε),
respectively. Assuming that fu and δu are Lipschitz continuous also in u
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(at least for u close to 0) in the form |fs(x) − fu(x)| + |δs(x) − δu(x)| ≤
K(x+ 1)|s− u| for some K > 0 and all s,u,x≥ 0, we obtain that if υ0 = z
and F0(υ) = (f0(z)−L)+ or = (L− f0(z))+, then
|Fs(υ)−F0(z)| ≤Ks
(
1 + sup
0≤u≤s
|υu|
)
+K sup
0≤u≤s
|υu − z|.
Using some of the estimates of Section 4, it is not difficult to see from here
that |V (z) − Vε(z)| and |V (n)(z) − V (n)ε (z)| do not exceed C(1 + z)
√
ε for
all small ε and some constant C. On the other hand, applying the same
estimates as in the proof of Theorem 2.1, we derive that, for some constant
C > 0 and all n, ε > 0,
|Vε(z)− V (n)ε (z)| ≤C(1 + z)ε−1n−1/4(lnn)3/4.
Choosing ε = n−1/6
√
lnn, we obtain that, under the above conditions in
the case of Asian options, |V (z) − V (n)(z)| can be estimated by 3C(1 +
z)n−1/12(lnn)1/4.
Another important example of path-dependent payoffs are, so-called, Rus-
sian options where, for instance,
Ft(υ) =max
(
m, sup
u∈[0,t]
υu
)
and ∆t(υ) = δυt.
Such payoffs satisfy the conditions of Theorem 2.1. Indeed, (2.1) is clear in
this case and (2.2) follows since, for t≥ s,
max
(
m, sup
u∈[0,t]
vu
)
−max
(
m, sup
u∈[0,s]
vu
)
≤ sup
u∈[0,t]
vu − sup
u∈[0,s]
vu
≤ sup
u∈[s,t]
vu− vs
≤ sup
u∈[s,t]
|vu − vs|.
In fact, the estimates (2.13) can be improved a bit for the Russian options
case dropping the logarithmic term there (see Remark 3.7). Of course, con-
ditions (2.1) and (2.2) are always satisfied in the case of standard options
with payoffs depending only on the current stock price.
Observe that many other path-dependent and look back options have
payoffs which can be represented via functions F and ∆ satisfying (2.1)
and (2.2). Barrier options have discontinuous payoffs which cannot be rep-
resented via functions satisfying (2.1) and (2.2), but a small modification of
our approach goes through in this case as well. This modification is based on
the observation that troubles with the approximation occur here when the
supremum of stock prices (or a similar quantity) belongs to a small neigh-
borhood of the barrier value, but the probability of this event is small since
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this supremum is usually a random variable having a bounded probability
density function.
In order to compare V (z) and V (n)(z) in the case of path dependent
payoffs, we have to consider both BS and CRR markets on one probability
space in an appropriate way and the main tool in achieving this goal will be
here the Skorokhod type embedding (see, e.g., [4], Section 37). In fact, for
the binomial i.i.d. random variables ξ1, ξ2, . . . and ξˆ1, ξˆ2, . . . appearing in the
setup of the CRR market models above, the embedding is explicit and no
general theorems are required, but if we want to extend the result for other
sequences of i.i.d. random variables, we have to rely upon the general result.
Namely, define recursively
θ
(n)
0 = 0, θ
(n)
k+1 = inf
{
t > θ
(n)
k : |B∗t −B∗θ(n)
k
|=
√
T
n
}
where, recall, B∗t =−κ2 t+Bt and
θˆ
(n)
0 = 0, θˆ
(n)
k+1 = inf
{
t > θˆ
(n)
k : |Bt −Bθˆ(n)
k
|=
√
T
n
}
.
The standard strong Markov property based arguments (cf. [4], Section 37)
show that θ
(n)
k − θ(n)k−1, k = 1,2, . . . , and θˆ(n)k − θˆ(n)k−1, k = 1,2, . . . , are i.i.d.
sequences of random variables such that (θ
(n)
k+1 − θ(n)k ,B∗θ(n)
k+1
− B∗
θ
(n)
k
) and
(θˆ
(n)
k+1 − θˆ(n)k ,Bθˆ(n)
k+1
− B
θˆ
(n)
k
) are independent of FB
θ
(n)
k
(where, recall, FBt =
σ{Bs, s≤ t}). This is standard for the Brownian motion Bt and the stopping
times θˆ
(n)
k (see [4], Section 37), but can be proved by exactly the same
method for the Brownian motion with a constant drift B∗t and the stopping
times θ
(n)
k as well.
Another way to justify this independency assertion is to apply the Gir-
sanov theorem (see [11, 13] and [28]) which is useful to have in mind in
our situation anyway. Namely, for any Brownian stopping time τ satisfying
EB exp(κ2τ/8)<∞, the process B∗t , t ≥ 0, becomes a standard Brownian
motion on the interval [0, τ ] with respect to the probability measure P ∗τ
determined by
dP ∗τ = q(τ,Bτ )dP
B or dPB = q∗(τ,B∗τ )dP
∗
τ ,(2.14)
where
q(t,Bt) = exp
(
κ
2
Bt − 1
8
κ2t
)
= exp
(
κ
2
B∗t +
1
8
κ2t
)
= (q∗(t,B∗t ))
−1.
Observe that if σ > τ is another Brownian stopping time, then P ∗σ = P ∗τ on
the σ-algebra FBτ so the above probability measures enable us to consider
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B∗t as a Brownian motion on any time interval. Hence, under the measure
P ∗, the process B∗t , t ≥ 0, together with the stopping times θ(n)k , k ≥ 0,
becomes the Brownian motion Bt, t≥ 0, together with the stopping times
θˆ
(n)
k , k ≥ 0. Hence, by the strong Markov property of the Brownian motion,
any two events A ∈ FB
θ
(n)
k
and A˜ ∈ σ{B∗
t+θ
(n)
k
− B∗
θ
(n)
k
, t ∈ [0, θ(n)k+1 − θ(n)k ]},
are independent under P ∗
θ
(n)
k+1
. But then A and A˜ will remain independent
under the original probability PB in view of the factorization property of
the density q∗,
q∗(θ(n)k+l,B
∗
θ
(n)
k+l
) = q∗(θ(n)k ,B
∗
θ
(n)
k
)q∗(θ(n)k+l− θ(n)k ,B∗θ(n)
k+l
−B∗
θ
(n)
k
)
with the first factor measurable with respect to FB
θ
(n)
k
and the second fac-
tor independent of it and having the same distribution as q∗(θ(n)l ,B
∗
θ
(n)
l
). It
follows that (θ
(n)
k+1 − θ(n)k ,B∗θ(n)
k+1
− B∗
θ
(n)
k
) is independent of FB
θ
(n)
k
under the
original probability PB as well.
It turns out (see [30] and the beginning of Section 4) that B∗
θ
(n)
1
has the
same distribution as
√
T
n ξ1. Clearly, Bθˆ(n)1
=
√
T
n or =−
√
T
n with the same
probability 1/2, and so B
θˆ
(n)
1
has the same distribution as
√
T
n ξˆ1. Set
Ξ
(n)
k =
(
T
n
)1/2 k∑
j=1
ξj and Ξˆ
(n)
k =
(
T
n
)1/2 k∑
j=1
ξˆj,(2.15)
then Ξ
(n)
k and Ξˆ
(n)
k have the same distribution as B
∗
θ
(n)
k
and B
θˆ
(n)
k
, respec-
tively.
Theorem 2.1 provides an approximation of the fair price of game options
in the BS market by means of fair prices of game options in the CRR market
which becomes especially useful if we can provide also a simple description of
rational (or δ-rational) exercise times of these options in the BS market via
exercise times of their CRR market approximations which are, by the defi-
nition, optimal (or δ-optimal) stopping times for the Dynkin games whose
price are given by (2.11) and (2.12), respectively. For each k = 1,2, . . . , in-
troduce the finite σ-algebra GB,nk = σ{B∗θ(n)1 ,B
∗
θ
(n)
2
−B∗
θ
(n)
1
, . . . ,B∗
θ
(n)
k
−B∗
θ
(n)
k−1
},
which is, clearly, isomorphic to Fξk = σ{ξi, i≤ k} considered before since each
element of GB,nk and of Fξk is an event of the form
AB,n
ι(k)
=
{
B∗
θ
(n)
j
−B∗
θ
(n)
j−1
= ιj
√
T
n
, j = 1, . . . , k
}
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and
Aξ
ι(k)
= {ξj = ιj , j = 1, . . . , k},
respectively, where ι(k) = (ι1, . . . , ιk) ∈ {−1,1}k , θ(n)0 = 0 and B0 = 0. Let
SB,n be the set of stopping times with respect to the filtration GB,nk , k =
0,1,2, . . . , where GB,n0 = {∅,ΩB} is the trivial σ-algebra and ΩB is the sam-
ple space of the Brownian motion. The subset of these stopping times with
values in {0,1, . . . , n} will be denoted by SB,n0,n . For each ι(n) = (ι1, . . . , ιn) ∈
{−1,1}n and k < n, we set ι(k) = (ι1, . . . , ιk) ∈ {−1,1}k . Denote by J0,n
the set of functions ν :{−1,1}n → {0,1, . . . , n} such that if ν( ι(n)) = k ≤ n
and ι˜(k) = ι(k) for some ι˜(n) ∈ {−1,1}n, then ν(ι˜(n)) = k as well. Define
the functions λ
(n)
ξ :Ωξ → {−1,1}n and λ(n)B :ΩB → {−1,1}n by λ(n)ξ (ω) =
(ξ1(ω), . . . , ξn(ω)) and
λ
(n)
B (ω) =
√
n
T
(B∗
θ
(n)
1 (ω)
(ω),B∗
θ
(n)
2 (ω)
(ω)−B∗
θ
(n)
1 (ω)
(ω), . . . ,
B∗
θ
(n)
n (ω)
(ω)−B∗
θ
(n)
n−1(ω)
(ω)),
where Ωξ and ΩB are sample spaces on which the sequence ξ1, ξ2, . . . and the
Brownian motion Bt are defined, respectively. It is clear that any ζ ∈ T ξ0n
and η ∈ SB,n0,n can be represented uniquely in the form ζ = µ ◦ λ(n)ξ and η =
ν ◦ λ(n)B for some µ, ν ∈ J0,n. Similarly, we introduce GˆB,nk = σ{Bθˆ(n)1 ,Bθˆ(n)2 −
B
θˆ
(n)
1
, . . . ,B
θˆ
(n)
k
−B
θˆ
(n)
k−1
}, which is isomorphic to Fˆξk = σ{ξˆi, i≤ k}, λˆ(n)ξ (ω) =
(ξˆ1(ω), . . . , ξˆn(ω)) and
λˆ
(n)
B (ω) =
√
n
T
(B
θˆ
(n)
1 (ω)
(ω),B
θˆ
(n)
2 (ω)
(ω)−B
θˆ
(n)
1 (ω)
(ω), . . . ,
B
θˆ
(n)
n (ω)
(ω)−B
θˆ
(n)
n−1(ω)
(ω)).
The following result will be proved in Section 5.
Theorem 2.2. There exists a constant C > 0 (which is, essentially,
estimated explicitly in the proof ) such that if ζ∗n = µ∗n◦λ(n)ξ and η∗n = ν∗n◦λ(n)ξ ,
µ∗n, ν∗n ∈ J0n, are rational exercise times for the game option in the CRR
market defined by (2.5), that is,
V (n)(z) = min
ζ∈T ξ0n
EξQ(n)z
(
ζ
T
n
, η∗n
T
n
)
= max
η∈T ξ0n
EξQ(n)z
(
ζ∗n
T
n
, η
T
n
)
,(2.16)
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then ϕ∗n = θ
(n)
µ∗n◦λ(n)B
and ψ∗n = θ
(n)
ν∗n◦λ(n)B
are δn(z)-rational exercise times for
the game option in the BS market defined by (2.3) and (2.4), that is,
sup
τ∈T B0T
EBQBz (ϕ
∗
n, τ)− δn(z)≤ V (z)≤ inf
σ∈T B
0T
EBQBz (σ,ψ
∗
n) + δn(z),(2.17)
where δn(z) =C(F0(z)+∆0(z)+z+1)n
−1/4(lnn)3/4. The assertions remain
true if we replace above λ
(n)
ξ , λ
(n)
B , Q
(n)
z and V (n)(z) by λˆ
(n)
ξ , λˆ
(n)
B , Qˆ
(n)
z and
Vˆ (n)(z), respectively.
It is well known (see, e.g., [26]) that when payoffs depend only on the
current stock price (a Markov case), δ-optimal stopping times of Dynkin’s
games can be obtained as first arrival times to domains where the payoff is
δ-close to the value of the game (as a function of the initial stock price). For
path dependent payoffs, the situation is more complicated and, in general, in
order to construct δ-optimal stopping times, we have to know the stochastic
process of values of the games starting at each time t ∈ [0, T ] conditioned
to the information up to t. It is not clear what kind of approximation of
this process can provide some information about δ-rational exercise times
and the convenient alternative method of their construction exhibited in
Theorem 2.2 seems to be important both for the theory and applications.
Moreover, this construction is effective and can be employed in practice
since µ∗n and ν∗n are functions on sequences of 1’s and −1’s which can be
computed (and stored in a computer) using the recursive formulas (1.7) even
before the stock evolution begins. In order to compute λ
(n)
B , we have to watch
the discounted stock price SˇBt (z) = e
−rtSBt (z) evolution of a real stock at
moments θ
(n)
k which are obtained recursively by θ
(n)
0 = 0 and
θ
(n)
k+1 = inf{t > θ(n)k : SˇBt (z) = e±κ(T/n)
1/2
SˇB
θ
(n)
k
(z)}(2.18)
and to construct the {1,−1} sequence λ(n)B (ω) by writing 1 or −1 on kth
place depending on whether SˇB
θ
(n)
k
(z) = eκ(T/n)
1/2
SˇB
θ
(n)
k−1
(z) or SˇB
θ
(n)
k
(z) =
e−κ(T/n)1/2 SˇB
θ
(n)
k−1
(z), respectively. Observe also that Theorem 2.2 can be ex-
tended to more general sequences of random variables ξ1, ξ2, . . . and ξˆ1, ξˆ2, . . . ,
but this does not seem to have much of an interest for applications.
Recall (see [28]) that a sequence π = (π1, . . . , πn) of pairs πk = (βk, γk)
of Fξk−1-measurable random variables βk, γk, k = 1, . . . , n, is called a self-
financing portfolio strategy in the CRR market determined by (1.2), (1.4),
(1.8) and (2.5) if the price of the portfolio at time k is given by the formula
Zπ,nk = βkbk + γkS
(n)
kT/n(z) = βk+1bk + γk+1S
(n)
kT/n(z)(2.19)
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and the latter equality means that all changes in the portfolio value are due
to capital gains and losses but not to withdrawal or infusion of funds. A pair
(ζ, π) of a stopping time ζ ∈ T ξ0n and a self-financing portfolio strategy π is
called a hedge for (against) the game option with the payoff R
(n)
z given by
(2.9) if (see [15])
Zπ,nζ∧k ≥R(n)z
(
ζT
n
,
kT
n
)
∀k = 0,1, . . . , n.(2.20)
It follows from [15] that, for any ζ ∈ T ξ0n, there exists a self-financing portfolio
strategy πζ so that (ζ, πζ) is a hedge. In particular, if we take the rational ex-
ercise time ζ = ζ∗n of the writer, then such πζ exists with the initial portfolio
capital V (n)(z). The construction of πζ goes directly via the Doob decompo-
sition of supermartingales and a martingale representation lemma (see [15]
and [28]), both being explicit in the CRR market case. In the continuous
time BS market we cannot write the corresponding portfolio strategies in an
explicit way, and so some approximations are necessary though, surprisingly,
this problem has not been treated before in the literature.
Theorem 2.3. Let ζ ∈ T ξ0n, π = πζ and (2.19) together with (2.20) hold
true with Fξk -measurable βk = βζk and γk = γξk, so that (ζ, πζ) is a hedge.
Then βζk = fk ◦ λ(k−1)ξ , γζk = gk ◦ λ(k−1)ξ and ζ = µ ◦ λ(n)ξ for some uniquely
defined functions fk, gk on {−1,1}k−1 and some µ ∈ J0n. Let ϕ= µ ◦ λ(n)B
and set βϕt = fk ◦λ(k−1)B and γϕt = gk ◦λ(k−1)B whenever t ∈ (θ(n)k−1, θ(n)k ]. Then
ZBt = β
ϕ
t bt + γ
ϕ
t S
B
t (z)(2.21)
is a self-financing portfolio in the BS market and there exists a constant
C > 0 such that
EB sup
0≤t≤T
(RBz (θ
(n)
ϕ , t)−ZBθ(n)ϕ ∧t)
+
(2.22)
≤C(F0(z) +∆0(z) + z +1)n−1/4(lnn)3/4,
where a+ =max(a,0). In particular, there exists a self-financing portfolio of
this form satisfying (2.22) with the initial value V (n)(z) [which according to
(2.13) is close to the fair price V (z) of the game option] taking ϕ∗ = µ∗ ◦λ(n)B
if ζ∗ = µ∗ ◦λ(n)ξ is the rational exercise time and π = πζ
∗
is the corresponding
optimal self-financing hedging portfolio strategy for the CRR market.
Inequality (2.22) estimates the expectation of the maximal shortfall (risk)
of certain (nearly hedging) portfolio strategy which can be constructed ef-
fectively in applications since the functions fl, gl and µ are determined by a
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self-financing hedging strategy in the CRR market which can be computed
directly and stored in a computer even before the real stock evolution begins
or in case of computer memory limitations, we can compute these functions
each time when needed using corresponding algorithms for the CRR market.
The functions λ
(n)
B or, in other words, the sequences from {−1,1}n which
should be plugged into the functions fl, gl and µ should be obtained in
practice by watching the evolution of the discounted stock price e−rtSBt at
moments θ
(n)
k as described after Theorem 2.2.
3. Auxiliary lemmas. In addition to the set SB,n of stopping times with
respect to the filtration {GB,nk }k=0,1,2,... introduced before Theorem 2.2, con-
sider also the set T B,n of stopping times with respect to the filtration
{FB
θ
(n)
k
}k=0,1,2,... with values in {0,1,2, . . .} and the subset of such stop-
ping times with values in {0,1, . . . , n} will be denoted by T B,n0,n . Clearly,
SB,n ⊂ T B,n. Set
SB,nt (z) = z exp
([nt/T ]∑
k=1
(
rT
n
+ κ(B∗
θ
(n)
k
−B∗
θ
(n)
k−1
)
))
if t ∈ [T/n,T ],
SB,nt = S
B,n
T if t > T and(3.1)
SB,nt = S
B,n
0 = z > 0 if t ∈ [0, T/n)
and let SˆB,nt be the corresponding expression if we replace in (3.1) r by
r− κ22 , B∗ by B, and θ
(n)
k ’s by θˆ
(n)
k . Denote
RB,nz (s, t) = Ft(S
B,n(z))Is≥t +Gs(SB,n(z))Is<t,
(3.2)
QB,nz (s, t) = e
−rs∧tRB,nz (s, t),
V B,n(z) = inf
ζ∈T B,n0,n
sup
η∈T B,n0,n
EBQB,nz
(
ζT
n
,
ηT
n
)
(3.3)
and
V B,nS (z) = min
ζ∈SB,n0,n
max
η∈SB,n0,n
EBQB,nz
(
ζT
n
,
ηT
n
)
.(3.4)
Consider also the corresponding quantities RˆB,nz (s, t), Qˆ
B,n
z (s, t), Vˆ
B,n(z)
and Vˆ B,nS (z) which are obtained by taking in the above formulas Sˆ
B,n
t in
place of SB,nt . Though V
B,n
S (z) and Vˆ
B,n
S (z) are not used in the proofs, their
introduction clarifies the nature of various sets of stopping times involved
here.
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The reason for considering the Skorokhod embedding here and the basis
for our proofs of Theorems 2.1–2.3 is the following result which is a general-
ization of Lemma 3.1 from [24] and which enables us to consider all relevant
processes on one probability space and to deal with stopping times with
respect to the same Brownian filtration only.
Lemma 3.1. For any z,n > 0,
V B,nS (z) = V
(n)(z) = V B,n(z).(3.5)
The same result holds true if we replace in (3.5) all V ’s by Vˆ ’s.
Proof. First, observe that θ
(n)
ζ ∈ T B for any ζ ∈ T B,n (see [24]), where
T B is the set of all almost surely (a.s.) finite stopping times for the Brownian
motion Bt, t≥ 0. Indeed,
{θ(n)ζ ≤ t}=
n⋃
k=0
{θ(n)k ≤ t} ∩ {ζ = k}(3.6)
and since {ζ = k} ∈ FB
θ
(n)
k
and {θ(n)k ≤ t} ∈ FBt , we conclude that the event
in the right-hand side of (3.6) belongs to FBt , and so θ(n)ζ is a stopping time.
Next, as we mentioned before the statement of Theorem 2.2, T ξ0n = {µ ◦
λ
(n)
ξ :µ ∈ J0,n} and SB,n0,n = {ν ◦λ(n)B :ν ∈ J0,n}. It is clear that, for any µ, ν ∈
J0,n,
Q(n)z
(
T
n
µ ◦ λ(n)ξ ,
T
n
ν ◦ λ(n)ξ
)
and QB,nz
(
T
n
µ ◦ λ(n)B ,
T
n
ν ◦ λ(n)B
)
have the same distributions, and so the first equality in (3.5) follows.
In order to prove the second equality in (3.5), we employ the dynamical
programming relations (1.7) for V
(n)
k,n = V
(n)
k,n (z) and for V
B,n
k,n = V
B,n
k,n (z),
k = 0,1, . . . , n, which in our case have the form
V (n) = V
(n)
0,n , V
(n)
n,n = e
−rTFT (S(n)) and
(3.7)
V
(n)
k,n =min(e
−rkT/nX(n)k (z),max(e
−rkT/nY (n)k (z),E(V
(n)
k+1,n|Fξk)))
and
V B,n = V B,n0,n , V
B,n
n,n = e
−rTFT (SB,n) and
(3.8)
V B,nk,n =min(e
−rkT/nXB,nk (z),max(e
−rkT/nY B,nk (z),E(V
B,n
k+1,n|FBθ(n)
k
))),
where X
(n)
k (z) and Y
(n)
k (z) are given by (2.6),
Y B,nk (z) = FkT/n(S
B,n(z)) and XB,nk (z) =GkT/n(S
B,n(z)).(3.9)
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For any numbers x1, x2, . . . , xn, set
x
(n)
t = x
(n)
t (z) = z exp
([nt/T ]∑
k=1
(
rT
n
+ κxk
))
if t≥ T/n
and x
(n)
t = x
(n)
t (z) = z if t ∈ [0, T/n). In view of (2.1), we can write
FkT/n(x
(n)(z)) = qk(z,x1, . . . , xk) and
(3.10)
∆kT/n(x
(n)(z)) = rk(z,x1, . . . , xk)
for some continuous functions qk and rk depending only on z,x1, . . . , xk.
Next, we show by the backward induction that there exist measurable func-
tions Φk(z,x1, . . . , xk), k = 1,2, . . . , n, and Φ0(z) such that
V
(n)
kn (z) = Φk
(
z,
(
T
n
)1/2
ξ1, . . . ,
(
T
n
)1/2
ξk
)
, V
(n)
0n (z) = Φ0(z)(3.11)
and
V B,nkn (z) = Φk(z,B
∗
θ
(n)
1
,B∗
θ
(n)
2
−B∗
θ
(n)
1
, . . . ,B∗
θ
(n)
k
−B∗
θ
(n)
k−1
),
(3.12)
V B,n0n (z) = Φ0(z).
Indeed, for k = n, set Φn(z,x1, . . . , xn) = e
−rT qn(z,x1, . . . , xn). Suppose that
the assertion holds true for k ≥ l + 1, that is, that for such k’s, we found
functions Φk satisfying (3.11) and (3.12). Now, set
Φl(z,x1, . . . , xl) = min(e
−rlT/n(ql(z,x1, . . . , xl) + rl(z,x1, . . . , xl)),
(3.13)
max(e−rlT/nql(z,x1, . . . , xl), hl(z,x1, . . . , xl))),
where
hl(z,x1, . . . , xl) =E
ξΦl+1(z,x1, . . . , xl, (T/n)
1/2ξl+1)
=EBΦl+1(z,x1, . . . , xl,B
∗
θ
(n)
l+1
−B∗
θ
(n)
l
).
Then (3.7) and (3.8) will be satisfied for k = l with V
(n)
kn (z) and V
B,n
kn (z)
given by (3.11) and (3.12), respectively, since ξl+1 and B
∗
θ
(n)
l+1
− B∗
θ
(n)
l
are
independent of Fξl and FB,nl , respectively, and so by the standard fact (see,
e.g., Example 34.3 in [4]),
E
(
Φl+1
(
z,
(
T
n
)1/2
ξ1, . . . ,
(
T
n
)1/2
ξl,
(
T
n
)1/2
ξl+1
)∣∣∣∣Fξl
)
= hl
(
z,
(
T
n
)1/2
ξ1, . . . ,
(
T
n
)1/2
ξl
)
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and
EB(Φl+1(z,B
∗
θ
(n)
1
,B∗
θ
(n)
2
−B∗
θ
(n)
1
, . . . ,B∗
θ
(n)
l
−B∗
θ
(n)
l−1
,B∗
θ
(n)
l+1
−B∗
θ
(n)
l
)|FB,nl )
= hl(z,B
∗
θ
(n)
1
,B∗
θ
(n)
2
−B∗
θ
(n)
1
, . . . ,B∗
θ
(n)
l
−B∗
θ
(n)
l−1
),
completing the induction. Now applying (3.11) and (3.12) with k = 0, we
arrive at the second equality in (3.5). We obtain the assertion (3.5) for Vˆ ’s
in place of V ’s exactly in the same way as above. 
Next, for readers’ convenience, we formulate a series of lemmas which
demonstrate the plan of our proof of Theorem 2.1 leaving till the next section
the actual proof of these results which rely on relatively standard stochastic
analysis estimates. We will do L1-estimates directly with respect to the
probability PB , though we could do instead L2 estimates with respect to
the probability P ∗τ , and then pass to estimates with respect to the original
measure PB using the Girsanov transformation (2.14) and the Cauchy–
Schwarz inequality. This would enable us to work from the beginning with
the stopping times θˆ
(n)
1 , θˆ
(n)
2 , . . . in place of θ
(n)
1 , θ
(n)
2 , . . . which is easier but,
on the other hand, would need L2 estimates which require few additional
lines anyway. We formulate results which lead to the required estimate of
|V (z)− V (n)(z)|. The corresponding estimate of |V (z) − Vˆ (n)(z)| proceeds
exactly in the same way replacing ξk’s by ξˆk’s and θ
(n)
k ’s by θˆ
(n)
k ’s which, in
fact, leads to a bit easier arguments.
First, observe that though SB,nt (z) defined by (3.1) is a piecewise constant
approximation of the BS stock price St(z) given by (2.4), there is certain
inconsistency there between times kT/n of jumps of SB,nt (z) and the values
B
θ
(n)
k
−B
θ
(n)
k−1
of jumps in the exponent which corresponds to the Brownian
stopping time θ
(n)
k . In order to pass to the correct time, we introduce
SB,θ,nt (z) = z exp(rθ
(n)
k + κB
∗
θ
(n)
k
) if θ
(n)
k ≤ t < θ(n)k+1, k = 0,1, . . . , n,
(3.14)
SB,θ,nt (z) = S
B,θ,n
θ
(n)
n
(z) if t≥ θ(n)n .
Set
RB,θ,nz (s, t) = Ft(S
B,θ,n(z))Is≥t +Gs(SB,θ,n(z))Is<t,
(3.15)
QB,θ,nz (s, t) = e
−rs∧tRB,θ,nz (s, t)
and
V B,θ,n(z) = inf
ζ∈T B,n0,n
sup
η∈T B,n0,n
EBQB,θ,nz (θ
(n)
ζ , θ
(n)
η ).(3.16)
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In order to compare V B,n(z) and V B,θ,n(z), we have to be able to compare
SB,nt (z) and S
B,θ,n
t (z) at the same time t ∈ [0, T ]. Definitions (3.1) and (3.14)
require us to compare then, in particular, B
θ
(n)
l
and B
θ
(n)
k
, provided lTn−1 ≤
t < (l+1)Tn−1 and θ(n)k ≤ t < θ(n)k+1. Via standard renewal theory arguments,
we conclude that in average |k − l| for such k, l ≤ n is of order n1/2, then
|θ(n)k − θ(n)l | is of order n−1/2, and so |Bθ(n)
k
− B
θ
(n)
l
| is roughly of order
n−1/4. The proof of the following result in the next section makes these
heuristic arguments precise and an effort is made to obtain as best as possible
estimates here.
Lemma 3.2. There exists a constant C > 0 such that, for all n, z > 0,
|V B,n(z)− V B,θ,n(z)|
(3.17)
≤C(F0(z) +∆0(z) + z +1)n−1/4(lnn)3/4.
The values V B,θ,n(z) are still defined for piecewise constant approxima-
tions SB,θ,n(z) of the BS stock prices SB given by (2.4). Thus, on the next
step we replace SB,θ,n(z) by SB estimating the corresponding error which
turns out to be of smaller order than in other lemmas, as we have to compare
the Brownian motion here at times s, t such that |t− s| ≤ θ(n)k − θ(n)k−1 and
since the latter is of order 1/n, the increment |Bt −Bs| is roughly of order
n−1/2 which is made precise in the following result.
Lemma 3.3. For each ε > 0, there exists Cε > 0 such that, for all z,n > 0
and ζ, η ∈ T B,n0,n ,
EB |QB,θ,nz (θ(n)ζ , θ(n)η )−QBz (θ(n)ζ , θ(n)η )|
≤EB max
0≤k,l≤n
|QB,θ,nz (θ(n)k , θ(n)l )−QBz (θ(n)k , θ(n)l )|(3.18)
≤Cεznε−1/2.
In (2.10) for V (z) the allowed stopping times take values in the interval
[0, T ], so we have to restrict the stopping times θ
(n)
k (which are not bounded)
to this interval. It is not difficult to understand that in the average |θ(n)n −T |
is of order n−1/2 and θ(n)n − θ(n)n ∧ T is of the same order. Then the absolute
value of the increment of the Brownian motion taken at times θ
(n)
n ∧ T and
θ
(n)
n is roughly of order n−1/4, and so the restriction of embedding times to
the interval [0, T ] leads to a difference of about that order (see also Remark
3.7 below).
Lemma 3.4. There exists a constant C > 0 such that, for all z,n > 0
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and ζ, η ∈ T B,n0,n ,
EB |QBz (θ(n)ζ , θ(n)η )−QBz (θ(n)ζ ∧ T, θ(n)η ∧ T )|
≤EB max
0≤k,l≤n
|QBz (θ(n)k , θ(n)l )−QBz (θ(n)k ∧ T, θ(n)l ∧ T )|(3.19)
≤C(F0(z) +∆0(z) + z +1)n−1/4.
Until now we considered only stopping times θ
(n)
k for k = 0,1, . . . , n, which
may not be enough, in principle, in order to approximate all Brownian stop-
ping times bounded by T , so the next result asserts that we can employ the
whole sequence θ
(n)
0 = 0, θ
(n)
1 , θ
(n)
2 , . . . . The estimates of the corresponding
difference here are similar to Lemma 3.4 and they produce, essentially, the
same result.
Lemma 3.5. There exists a constant C > 0 such that, for all z,n > 0
and ζ, η ∈ T B,n (with T B,n defined at the beginning of Section 3),
EB |QBz (θ(n)ζ ∧ T, θ(n)η ∧ T )−QBz (θ(n)ζ∧n ∧ T, θ(n)η∧n ∧ T )|
≤EB sup
0≤k,l<∞
|QBz (θ(n)k ∧ T, θ(n)l ∧ T )−QBz (θ(n)k∧n ∧ T, θ(n)l∧n ∧ T )|(3.20)
≤C(F0(z) +∆0(z) + z +1)n−1/4.
Set T B,nT = {θ(n)ζ ∧ T : ζ ∈ T B,n} and let
V B,n0,T (z) = inf
σ∈T B,n
T
sup
τ∈T B,nT
EBQBz (σ, τ).(3.21)
Then Lemmas 3.3–3.5 yield that, for some constant C > 0,
|V B,θ,n(z)− V B,n0,T (z)|
≤ sup
ζ∈T B,n
sup
η∈T B,n
EB(|QB,θ,nz (θ(n)ζ∧n, θ(n)η∧n)−QBz (θ(n)ζ∧n, θ(n)η∧n)|
+ |QBz (θ(n)ζ∧n, θ(n)η∧n)−QBz (θ(n)ζ∧n ∧ T, θ(n)η∧n ∧ T )|
(3.22)
+ |QBz (θ(n)ζ∧n ∧ T, θ(n)η∧n ∧ T )
−QBz (θ(n)ζ ∧ T, θ(n)η ∧ T )|)
≤ 3C(F0(z) +∆0(z) + z +1)n−1/4.
In definition (3.21) of V B,n0,T (z) we consider only stopping times of the
special form, while in (2.11), which gives V (z), all Brownian stopping times
with values in [0, T ] are allowed and the last step in the proof of Theorem
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2.1 is to estimate the corresponding error which turns out to be of the same
order as in Lemma 3.3 since, again, we have to estimate increments |Bt−Bs|
when |t− s| ≤ θ(n)k − θ(n)k−1, though here k runs over all positive integers and
not only up to n as in Lemma 3.3.
Lemma 3.6. For any ε > 0, there exists a constant Cε > 0 such that, for
all z,n > 0,
|V (z)− V B,n0,T (z)| ≤Cε(F0(z) +∆0(z) + z +1)nε−1/2.(3.23)
Lemmas 3.1–3.6 yield the required estimate of |V (z)−V (n)(z)| from The-
orem 2.1 and the corresponding estimate of |V (z)− Vˆ (n)(z)| goes through
exactly in the same way.
Remark 3.7. The estimate of Theorem 2.1 (and so the estimates of
Theorems 2.2 and 2.3) seems to be, essentially, optimal under the general
conditions (2.1) and (2.2) at least, using the method which relies on the
Skorokhod embedding as above. It is known and can be seen from the proof
of Lemma 3.2 that the embedding procedure cannot provide, in general,
a better than n−1/4 estimate there. One may restrict the class of payoffs
assuming, for instance, that for piecewise constant functions v of time t ∈
[0, T ], the functionals Ft(v) and ∆t(v) depend only on the values of v but
not on the time intervals between jumps of v. This condition is satisfied,
for instance, in the case of Russian type options. Then we can skip Lemma
3.2 and after a slight modification of Lemma 3.1, we can proceed directly to
Lemma 3.3. In view of Lemmas 3.3–3.6, this would lead to a slightly better
estimate Cn−1/4 than the estimate (2.13) of Theorem 2.1. Still, it does
not seem possible to obtain under reasonably general conditions (which are
satisfied, say, for Russian options) better that n−1/4 estimates in Lemmas
3.4 and 3.5. Indeed, in order to obtain specific estimates, we have to get rid
of the general functionals F and ∆ using the assumptions (2.1) and (2.2),
which inevitably leads to an estimate of
EB sup
θ
(n)
n ∧T≤t≤θ(n)n ∨T
|Bt −Bθ(n)
k
∧T |
(in fact, of a bit larger expression), which by the Burkholder–Davis–Gandy
inequality (see [11], Theorem 3.1 in Section 3.3 and [13], Theorem 3.28 in
Section 3.3) is of order
EB(θ(n)n ∨ T − θ(n)n ∧ T )1/2
and the latter expression is of order n−1/4. The main obstruction to a bet-
ter estimate of the first expression above is that (2.2) requires us to write
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the supremum and the absolute value inside and not outside of the expec-
tation. This obstruction disappears in the other two papers [24] and [30]
employing the Skorokhod embedding which also have to face estimates of
the error originated from the fact that, after embedding, we have to con-
sider the Brownian motion until the stopping time θ
(n)
n which differs from
the expiry time T by about n−1/2. In [30] only European options with pay-
offs depending on the current stock price are considered, which enables the
author to apply the simple random walk machinery leading to better esti-
mates. In [24] and in its generalization considered in Section 6 below the
payoffs also depend only on the current stock price, which together with
the smoothness assumption enables us to use the Itoˆ formula leading to
the Dynkin formula where the stochastic integral part disappears and the
remaining Riemann integral taken between T and θ
(n)
n has the same order
n−1/2 as |T − θ(n)n |. There exist other methods of strong invariance principle
type uniform approximations of the Brownian motion by means of properly
normalized sums of i.i.d. random variables (see, e.g., [3, 16, 31]) which may
give a better rate of approximation, but the problem arising there is to find
a proper substitution to Lemma 3.1 which would enable us not only to con-
sider corresponding processes on one probability space, but also to deal with
stopping times with respect to the same filtration in the inf sup formulas ex-
pressing values of corresponding Dynkin’s games. In the case of European
options (or contingent claims) with path dependent payoffs satisfying (2.1),
we do not have to worry about stopping times and need only to produce a
best possible uniform approximation of BS stock prices by appropriate CRR
stock prices. Employing the quantile transformation method from [16] and
[31], this can always be done with an error (roughly) of order n−1/2. On
the other hand, the method of [3] can be used, in principle, in order to ap-
proximate markets where stock prices evolve not necessarily as a geometric
Brownian motion.
Remark 3.8. It follows from [14] that, with probability one,
lim sup
n→∞
(|B
θ
(n)
n
−BT |n1/4(lnn)−1/2(ln lnn)−1/4) = 21/4.
It would be interesting to understand whether the estimate (2.13) of Theo-
rem 2.1 can be improved to Cn−1/4
√
lnn(ln lnn)1/4 or the present estimate
is sharp. In view of Lemma 4.1 below, the estimate (2.13) is connected with
the bound for
EB max
0≤k≤n
|B
θ
(n)
k
−BkT/n|,
though (2.13) requires also an estimate of H
(n)
2 in the next section which
does not seem to be reducible to this one. This question can be formulated
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in the following classical form. Let Θˆ0 = 0 and, successively, Θˆn+1 = inf{t >
Θˆn : |Bt −BΘˆn |= 1} with B0 = 0. The result of [14] gives that, with proba-
bility one,
lim sup
n→∞
(|BΘˆn −Bn|n−1/4(lnn)−1/2(ln lnn)−1/4) = 21/4.
For our problem, we need to know the asymptotical behavior as n→∞ of
EB max
0≤k≤n
|BΘˆk −Bk|.
Our estimates give the bound Cn1/4(lnn)3/4 for this expectation. Is there a
better bound or this bound the best possible?
4. Proving the estimates. Set
B
(n)
t =−
κt
2
√
T
n
+Bt and Θ
(n) = inf{t > 0 : |B(n)t |= 1}.
By the scaling property of the Brownian motion,√
T
n
B
(n)
t
d∼B∗(T/nt) and θ(n)1 d∼
T
n
Θ(n),(4.1)
where ξ
d∼ ξ˜ means that ξ and ξ˜ have the same distribution. Observe that,
in view of independency of increments Bl −Bl−1, l= 1,2, . . . , for any n≥ 1,
PB{Θ(n) ≥ k} ≤ PB{|Bl −Bl−1| ≤ 2 + κ
√
T ∀ l= 1, . . . , k}= e−bT k,(4.2)
where bT =− lnPB{|B1| ≤ 2 + κ
√
T }> 0. It follows that, for any nonnega-
tive a < bT ,
EBeaΘ
(n) ≤
∞∑
k=0
ea(k+1)PB{Θ(n) ≥ k} ≤ ea(1− ea−bT )−1 <∞.(4.3)
The estimates of Section 3 are not trivial only for large n, so we will assume
that n is sufficiently big, in particular, that various exponential moments of
the form EB exp(aTn Θ
(n)) are finite, that is, that n> aTb−1T .
Since expκB∗t , t≥ 0, is a martingale with respect to the probability PB ,
and so EB exp(κB∗
θ
(n)
1
) = 1 (assuming that n > 12Tb
−1
T ), we derive by an
easy computation that B∗
θ
(n)
1
=
√
T
n or = −
√
T
n and B
(n)
Θ(n)
= 1 or = −1
with probability (1 + exp(κ
√
T
n ))
−1 or (1 + exp(−κ
√
T
n ))
−1, respectively.
Set αn = E
BΘ(n) so that EBθ
(n)
1 = αn
T
n . Since the Brownian motion is a
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martingale, and so EBBΘ(n) = 0, we have that
−κ
2
αn
√
T
n
=EB
(
−κ
2
Θ(n)
√
T
n
+BΘ(n)
)
= (1+ eκ
√
T/n )−1 − (1 + e−κ
√
T/n )−1.
This together with an easy estimate shows that
|αn − 1| ≤min
(
2κ−1
√
n
T
,
κ2T
2n
∣∣∣∣1− κ2Tn
∣∣∣∣−1
)
≤K1T
n
,(4.4)
where
K1 =min(2κ
−1(2κ2 + T−1)3/2, κ2).
By (4.2),
EB |Θ(n)|m ≤Mm =
∞∑
k=1
kme−bT (k−1)
(4.5)
≤ e2bT
∫ ∞
0
xme−bT x dx= e2bTm!b−(m+1)T .
Assuming, without loss of generality, that n ≥K1T , we obtain from (4.4)
that
PB{|Θ(n) −αn|m ≥ k} ≤ PB{Θ(n) ≥ k− 2},
and so
EB |Θ(n) − αn|m ≤
∞∑
k=1
kme−bT (k−3) = e2bTMm.(4.6)
Observe that θ
(n)
k − αnk Tn , k = 0,1,2, . . . , is a martingale with respect to
the filtration FB
θ
(n)
k
, k ∈ N. Thus, using that (a+ b)m ≤ 2m−1(am + bm) for
a, b≥ 0, m≥ 1, we obtain by (4.1), (4.4), (4.6) and the Burkholder–Davis–
Gandy inequality (see [11], Theorem 3.1 in Section 3.3 and [13], Theorem
3.28 in Section 3.3) that, for any m> 1/2,
EB sup
ζ∈T B,n0,n
∣∣∣∣θ(n)ζ − ζ Tn
∣∣∣∣2m
=EB max
0≤k≤n
∣∣∣∣θ(n)k − kTn
∣∣∣∣2m
≤ 22m−1T 2m|αn − 1|2m +22m−1EB max
0≤k≤n
∣∣∣∣θ(n)k − αn kTn
∣∣∣∣2m
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(4.7)
≤ 22m−1K2m1 T 4mn−2m +22m−1Λm
(
nEB
∣∣∣∣θ(n)1 −αnTn
∣∣∣∣2
)m
≤ 22m−1T 2mn−m(T 2mK2m1 n−m +Λme2mbTMm2 )
≤K(m)2 T 2mn−m,
where Λm = 4
m2mm(2m+1)(2m − 1)m(1−2m) and K(m)2 = 22m−1(K2m1 T 2m +
Λme
2mbTMm2 ) assuming that n ≥ 1. We will need (4.7) mostly with m= 1
which requires only the Doob–Kolmogorov inequality (see, e.g., [11]) and in
order to simplify notation, we set K2 =K
(1)
2 .
Using the exponential martingale exp(aBt− 12a2t) and applying the Doob–
Kolmogorov and Cauchy–Schwarz inequalities, we obtain
EB sup
0≤t≤τ
exp(aBt)≤ EBe(1/2)a2τ sup
0≤t≤τ
exp(aBt − 12a2t)
≤ (EBea2τ )1/2
(
EB sup
0≤t≤τ
exp(2aBt − a2t)
)1/2
≤ 2(EBea2τ )1/2(EB exp(2aBτ − a2τ))1/2(4.8)
≤ 2(EBea2τ )1/2(EB exp(4aBτ − 8a2τ))1/4(EBe6a2τ )1/4
= 2(EBea
2τ )1/2(EBe6a
2τ )1/4
for any finite Brownian stopping time τ and a number a. If σ ≤ τ is another
Brownian stopping time, then by the Burkholder–Davis–Gandy inequality
(see [11] and [13]) applied to the (continuous) martingale (stochastic inte-
gral)
∫ t
0 Iσ<s≤τ dBs we obtain that, for any m> 0,
EB sup
σ≤t≤τ
|Bt −Bσ|2m ≤ ΛmEB |τ − σ|m,(4.9)
where Λm is the same as in (4.7) and, again, we will use (4.9) only for
m> 1/2. Recall that our relevant formulas do not depend on a particular
choice of a continuous in time version of the Brownian motion Bt and each
such version is, in fact, Ho¨lder continuous with probability one.
In the proof of Lemma 3.2 we will need also certain renewal theory es-
timates which seem to be standard, but, since we could not find a direct
reference, their proof for readers’ convenience is given here.
Lemma 4.1. Let k
(n)
t = max{j ≤ n : θ(n)j ≤ t} for all t ≥ 0 and ℓ(n)t =
[nt/T ] if t ∈ [0, T ] and ℓ(n)t = n if t > T . Then
EB sup
0≤t≤T
|k(n)t − ℓ(n)t |2 ≤ 2EB sup
0≤t≤T
|k(n)t − nt/T |2 + 2≤ 2(K2 +2)n(4.10)
BINOMIAL APPROXIMATIONS OF GAME OPTIONS 27
and
EB sup
0≤t≤θ(n)n
|B
θ
(n)
k
(n)
t
−B
θ
(n)
ℓ
(n)
t
|2 ≤K3n−1/2(lnn)3/2,(4.11)
where K3 > 0 can be estimated from the proof below.
Proof. Let Θ
(n)
1 ,Θ
(n)
2 , . . . be i.i.d. random variables with the same dis-
tribution as Θ(n). Set m
(n)
u = max{j ≤ n :∑ji=1Θ(n)i ≤ u}, then, by (4.1),
the process m
(n)
nt/T , t ∈ [0, T ], has the same distribution as the process k
(n)
t ,
t ∈ [0, T ]. Hence,
EB sup
0≤t≤T
|k(n)t − nt/T |2 =EB sup
0≤u≤n
|m(n)u − u|2.
Set Ψt =
∑[t]
j=1Θ
(n)
j for t≥ 1 and Ψt =Ψ0 = 0 for t ∈ [0,1). It is clear that if
l < n, then m
(n)
u − u= l− u if and only if l−Ψl ≥ l− u > l−Ψl+1, and so
in this case
|m(n)u − u| ≤max(|Ψl − l|, |Ψl+1 − (l+ 1)|+ 1).
If m
(n)
u = n and u≤ n, then Ψn ≤ u≤ n, and so |m(n)u −u| ≤ |Ψn−n|. Hence,
max
0≤u≤n
|m(n)u − u| ≤ max
0≤l≤n
|Ψl − l|+ 1.(4.12)
Observe that, by (4.4), for any l≤ n,
|Ψl − l| ≤ |Ψl − lαn|+K1T,(4.13)
and so by the Doob–Kolmogorov inequality,
EB max
0≤l≤n
|Ψl − l|2 ≤ 2EB max
0≤l≤n
|Ψl − lαn|2 + 2K21T 2
≤ 8EB |Ψn − nαn|2 +2K21T 2 = 8nEB(Θ(n) − αn)2 + 2K21T 2
and (4.10) follows from (4.4) and (4.6).
Next, we prove (4.11) estimating, first,
sup
0≤t≤θ(n)n
|B
θ
(n)
k
(n)
t
−B
θ
(n)
ℓ
(n)
t
|2
≤ 4I
sup
0≤t≤θ(n)n
|k(n)t −ℓ(n)t |>D
√
n lnn
sup
0≤t≤θ(n)n
|Bt|2
+4I
max
k,l≤n,|k−l|≤D
√
n lnn
|θ(n)
k
−θ(n)
l
|>D2
√
n−1 lnn sup
0≤t≤θ(n)n
|Bt|2
(4.14)
+ 4Imaxk≤n sup
0≤t≤D2
√
n−1 lnn |Bθ(n)
k
+t
−B
θ
(n)
k
|>D2n−1/4(lnn)3/4
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× sup
0≤t≤θ(n)n
|Bt|2
+D4n−1/2(lnn)3/2,
where D> 0 will be chosen below. Observe that
sup
0≤t≤θ(n)n
|k(n)t − ℓ(n)t | ≤ 2 sup
0≤t≤T
|k(n)t − ℓ(n)t |(4.15)
since, by the definition of k
(n)
t and ℓ
(n)
t ,
sup
T≤t≤T∨θ(n)n
|k(n)t − ℓ(n)t | ≤ n− k(n)T = ℓ(n)T − k(n)T .
Since |k(n)t − ℓ(n)t | ≤ |k(n)t − nt/T | + 1 and the processes m(n)nt/T , t ∈ [0, T ],
and k
(n)
t , t ∈ [0, T ], have the same distribution, we derive from (4.12), (4.13)
and (4.15) that
PB
{
sup
0≤t≤θ(n)n
|k(n)t − ℓ(n)t |>D
√
n lnn
}
≤ PB
{
max
0≤l≤n
|Ψl − lαn|> 12D
√
n lnn− 2
}
(4.16)
≤
n∑
l=0
(PB{Ψl − lαn > 12D
√
n lnn− 2}
+PB{lαn −Ψl > 12D
√
n lnn− 2}).
By (4.5), (4.6), Chebyshev’s inequality and the definition of Ψl,
PB
{
Ψl − lαn > 1
2
D
√
n lnn− 2
}
≤ PB
{
exp
(
2
√
n−1 lnn
l∑
i=1
(Θ
(n)
i − αn)
)
≥ nDe−4
}
≤ e4n−D(EB exp(2
√
n−1 lnn(Θ(n)i −αn)))l(4.17)
≤ e4n−D
(
1 + e2bT
∞∑
m=2
(
4 lnn
n
)m/2Mm
m!
)n
≤ e4n(8e4bT b−3T −D) ≤ e4n−2,
where we use the inequality (1 + a/q)q < ea for a, q > 0, choose D ≥ 2 +
8e4bT b−3T and assume that n≥ 2(16/b2T )2, so that n−1 lnn≤ b2T /16. Similarly,
under the same conditions,
PB{lαn −Ψl > 12D
√
n lnn− 2} ≤ e4n−2.(4.18)
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Next, by (4.1), (4.3) and the Chebyshev inequality,
PB
{
max
k,l≤n,|k−l|≤D
√
n lnn
|θ(n)k − θ(n)l |>D2
√
n−1 lnn
}
≤ nPB{θ(n)
[D
√
n lnn]
>D2
√
n−1 lnn}
= nPB{anT−1θ(n)
[D
√
n lnn]
> aD2T−1
√
n lnn}(4.19)
≤ n exp(−aD2T−1
√
n lnn )EB exp(anT−1θ(n)
[D
√
n lnn ]
)
≤ n(exp(−aDT−1)EBeaΘ(n))D
√
n lnn ≤ n−1,
(where [b] is the integral part of b) if we choose a positive a < bT ,
D ≥ Ta−1(1− ln(1−ea−bT ))+T+1 so that (ea(DT−1−1)(1−ea−bT ))D ≥ e,
and assume that n≥ e3, so that n−1 lnn≤ 1/4. Now, by the strong Markov
property, the reflection principle and the scaling property of the Brownian
motion (see, e.g., [13], Chapter 2),
PB
{
max
k≤n
sup
θ
(n)
k
≤t≤θ(n)
k
+D2
√
n−1 lnn
|Bt −Bθ(n)
k
|>D2n−1/4(lnn)3/4
}
≤ nPB
{
sup
0≤t≤D2
√
n−1 lnn
|Bt|>D2n−1/4(lnn)3/4
}
≤ 4nPB{B
D2
√
n−1 lnn >D
2n−1/4(lnn)3/4}
(4.20)
= 4nPB{B1 >D
√
lnn}
= 4n
∫ ∞
D(lnn)1/2
(2π)−1/2e−x
2/2 dx
≤ 8n
D
√
2π lnn
e−(1/2)D
2 lnn ≤ 4
n
√
2π lnn
,
provided we choose D ≥ 2. Finally, by (4.1), (4.4) and (4.9),
EB sup
0≤t≤θ(n)n
|Bt|2 ≤ 4EBθ(n)n = 4Tαn ≤ 4T (1 +K1T ),(4.21)
and we obtain (4.11) from (4.14) and (4.16)–(4.21) together with the Cauchy–
Schwarz inequality. 
Now we are ready to pass directly to the proof of Lemma 3.2.
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Proof of Lemma 3.2. By (3.3), (3.16) and the equality θ
(n)
ζ ∧ θ(n)η =
θ
(n)
ζ∧η,
|V B,n(z)− V B,θ,n(z)| ≤ sup
ζ∈T B,n0,n
sup
η∈T B,n0,n
(J1(ζ, η) + J2(ζ, η)),(4.22)
where
J1(ζ, η) =E
B
(
|e−rT/nζ∧η − e−rθ
(n)
ζ∧η |RB,nz
(
ζT
n
,
ηT
n
))
and
J2(ζ, η) =E
B
∣∣∣∣RB,nz
(
ζT
n
,
ηT
n
)
−RB,θ,nz (θ(n)ζ , θ(n)η )
∣∣∣∣.
Since |e−ra − e−rb| ≤ r|a− b|, we obtain by (4.7) and the Cauchy–Schwarz
inequality
J1(ζ, η)≤ rEB
∣∣∣∣θ(n)ζ∧η − Tn ζ ∧ η
∣∣∣∣RB,nz
(
ζT
n
,
ηT
n
)
(4.23)
≤
√
K2rT√
n
(J11(η, ζ))
1/2,
where by (2.3), (3.1), (3.2) and (4.8),
J11(ζ, η) =E
B
(
RB,nz
(
ζT
n
,
ηT
n
))2
≤ 2EB((F(T/n)ζ∧η(SB,n(z)))2 + (∆(T/n)ζ∧η(SB,n(z)))2)
≤ 6
(
F 20 (z) +∆
2
0(z) + 2L
2(T + 2)2EB
(
1 + sup
0≤t≤T
(SB,nt (z))
2
))
(4.24)
≤ 6
(
F 20 (z) +∆
2
0(z) + 2L
2(T + 2)2
(
1 + z2e2rTEB sup
0≤t≤θ(n)n
e2κBt
))
≤ 6(F 20 (z) +∆20(z)
+ 4L2(T +2)2(1 + z2e2rT (EBe4κ
2θ
(n)
n )1/2(EBe24κ
2θ
(n)
n )1/4)).
Since
θ(n)n =
n∑
k=1
(θ
(n)
k − θ(n)k−1) and Bθ(n)n =
n∑
k=1
(B
θ
(n)
k
−B
θ
(n)
k−1
)
are sums of i.i.d. random variables, we obtain by (4.1)–(4.5) and the Taylor
formula that, for any a > 0,
EBeaθ
(n)
n = (EBea(T/n)Θ
(n)
)n
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≤
(
1 + a(K1 +1)
T
n
+
a2T 2
n2
∞∑
m=0
amTmMm+2
nm(m+2)!
)n
(4.25)
≤
(
1 + a(K1 + 1)
T
n
+ a2T 2b−3n−2 exp
(
2bT +
aT
nbT
))n
≤ Ca = ea(K1+1)T ,
provided n ≥ Tb−3T exp(2bT + aTb−1T ) and we use that (1 + a/q)q ≤ ea if
a, q > 0. This together with (4.8) gives also
EBe
aB
θ
(n)
n ≤ 2(EBea2θ(n)n )1/2(EBe6a2θ(n)n )1/4 ≤ 2(Ca2)1/2(C6a2)1/4,(4.26)
assuming that n≥ Tb−3T exp(2bT + 2a2Tb−1T ).
Next, we estimate J2(ζ, η). By (3.2) and (3.15),
J2(ζ, η)≤EB(|FζT/n(SB,n(z))−Fθ(n)
ζ
(SB,θ,n(z))|
+ |FηT/n(SB,n(z))−Fθ(n)η (S
B,θ,n(z))|(4.27)
+ |∆ζT/n(SB,n(z))−∆θ(n)
ζ
(SB,θ,n(z))|).
For any ζ ∈ T B,n0,n , we obtain from (2.1) and (2.2) that
|FζT/n(SB,n(z))− Fθ(n)
ζ
(SB,θ,n(z))|
≤ max
0≤k≤n
(|F
θ
(n)
k
(SB,n(z))− F
θ
(n)
k
(SB,θ,n(z))|
(4.28)
+ |FkT/n(SB,n(z))− Fθ(n)
k
(SB,n(z))|)
≤ L(θ(n)n +1)J21 +L max
0≤k≤n
∣∣∣∣θ(n)k − kTn
∣∣∣∣(1 + J22) +LJ23,
where
J21 = sup
0≤t≤θ(n)n
|SB,nt (z)− SB,θ,nt (z)|,
(4.29)
J22 = sup
0≤t≤T
SB,nt (z)≤ zerT sup
0≤t≤θ(n)n
eκBt
and
J23 = max
0≤k≤n
sup
(kT/n)∧θ(n)
k
≤u≤t≤(kT/n)∨θ(n)
k
|SB,nt (z)− SB,nu (z)|.
Set
H
(n)
1 (t) =
∣∣∣∣r
(
θ
(n)
k
(n)
t
−ℓ(n)t
T
n
)
+κ(B∗
θ
(n)
k
(n)
t
−B∗
θ
(n)
ℓ
(n)
t
)
∣∣∣∣ and H(n)1 = sup
0≤t≤θ(n)n
H
(n)
1 (t),
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with k
(n)
t and ℓ
(n)
t defined in Lemma 4.1. Then by (3.1), (3.14) and (4.29),
J21 ≤ J22IH(n)1 ≤1 sup
0≤t≤θ(n)n
|eH(n)1 (t) − 1|
+ I
H
(n)
1 >1
sup
0≤t≤θ(n)n
(SB,nt (z) + S
B,θ,n
t (z))(4.30)
≤ 2zerT sup
0≤t≤θ(n)n
eκBtH
(n)
1 + 2zIH(n)1 >1
(erT + erθ
(n)
n )
(
sup
0≤t≤θ(n)n
eκBt
)
.
Next, by (4.15),
H
(n)
1 ≤
∣∣∣∣r− κ22
∣∣∣∣ max0≤k≤n
∣∣∣∣θ(n)k − kTn
∣∣∣∣
(4.31)
+ 2
T
n
∣∣∣∣r− κ22
∣∣∣∣ sup
0≤t≤T
|k(n)t − ℓ(n)t |+ κ sup
0≤t≤θ(n)n
|B
θ
(n)
k
(n)
t
−B
θ
(n)
ℓ
(n)
t
|.
Hence, by (4.7), (4.10), (4.11), (4.31), the Cauchy–Schwarz and the Cheby-
shev inequalities, it follows that there exists a constant C˜ > 0 such that
PB{H(n)1 > 1} ≤ C˜n−1/2(lnn)3/2.(4.32)
This together with (4.7), (4.8), (4.10), (4.11), (4.25), (4.30), (4.31) and the
Cauchy–Schwarz inequalities yields that there exists a constant C(1) > 0
such that
EBJ21 ≤C(1)zn−1/4(lnn)3/4(4.33)
and both C˜ and C(1) can be estimated from the above formulas.
In order to estimate J23, set
H
(n)
2 (s, t) =
rT
n
(ℓ
(n)
t − ℓ(n)s ) + κ(B∗θ(n)
ℓ
(n)
t
−B∗
θ
(n)
ℓ
(n)
s
)
and
H
(n)
2 = max
0≤k≤n
sup
(kT/n)∧θ(n)
k
≤s≤t≤(kT/n)∨θ(n)
k
∧T
H
(n)
2 (s, t).
Then by (3.1), similarly to (4.30),
J23 ≤ 2J22(IH(n)2 >1 +H
(n)
2 ).(4.34)
If kTn ∧ θ
(n)
k ≤ s≤ t≤ kTn ∨ θ
(n)
k , then by (4.4),
ℓ
(n)
t − ℓ(n)s ≤
n
T
(t− s) + 1≤ n
T
max
0≤k≤n
∣∣∣∣θ(n)k − kTn
∣∣∣∣+ 1
(4.35)
≤ n
T
max
0≤k≤n
∣∣∣∣θ(n)k − kTnαn
∣∣∣∣+K1T +1
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and
θ
(n)
ℓ
(n)
t
− θ(n)
ℓ
(n)
s
≤
∣∣∣∣θ(n)ℓ(n)t −
ℓ
(n)
t T
n
∣∣∣∣+
∣∣∣∣θ(n)ℓ(n)s −
ℓ
(n)
s T
n
∣∣∣∣+ Tn |ℓ(n)t − ℓ(n)s |
≤ 3 max
0≤k≤n
∣∣∣∣θ(n)k − kTn
∣∣∣∣+ Tn(4.36)
≤ 3 max
0≤k≤n
∣∣∣∣θ(n)k − kTn αn
∣∣∣∣+3K4n−1,
where K4 = T (K1T + 1). Hence, similarly to (4.14) and (4.31),
H
(n)
2 ≤
∣∣∣∣r− 3κ22
∣∣∣∣ max0≤k≤n
∣∣∣∣θ(n)k − kTn
∣∣∣∣+
∣∣∣∣1− κ22
∣∣∣∣Tn
+ max
0≤k≤n
sup
t≤θ(n)n −θ(n)k ,0≤t≤3max0≤l≤n |θ
(n)
l
−(lT /n)αn|+3K4n−1
|B
θ
(n)
k
+t
(4.37)
−B
θ
(n)
k
|
and
sup
k≤n,t≤θ(n)n −θ(n)k ,0≤t≤3max0≤l≤n |θ
(n)
l
−(lT /n)αn|+3K4n−1
|B
θ
(n)
k
+t
−B
θ
(n)
k
|
≤ 2I
max0≤l≤n |θ(n)l −(lT /n)αn|>(1/3)D
√
n−1 lnn−K4n−1
× sup
0≤t≤θ(n)n
|Bt|+Dn−1/4(lnn)3/4(4.38)
+ 2Imax0≤k≤n sup
0≤t≤D
√
n−1 lnn |Bθ(n)
k
+t
−B
θ
(n)
k
|>Dn−1/4(lnn)3/4
× sup
0≤t≤θ(n)n
|Bt|.
Since the sequence {θ(n)l , l ≥ 1} has the same distribution as the sequence
{TnΨl, l≥ 1} defined in the proof of Lemma 4.1, then in the same way as in
(4.16) and (4.17), we obtain
PB
{
max
0≤l≤n
∣∣∣∣θ(n)l − lTn αn
∣∣∣∣> 13D
√
n−1 lnn−K4n−1
}
(4.39)
= PB
{
max
0≤l≤n
|Ψl − lαn|> D
3T
√
n lnn−K4T−1
}
≤ e3K4n−1,
provided we choose D ≥ 2+18T 2e2bT b−3T and assume that n≥ 2(36T 2/b2T )2,
so that n−1 lnn≤ 136T−2b2T . Hence, by (4.7), (4.9), (4.20), (4.37)–(4.39), the
Cauchy–Schwarz and Chebyshev inequalities, it follows that there exists a
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constant C˜ > 0 such that
PB{H(n)2 > 1} ≤ C˜n−1/2(lnn)3/2.
This together with (4.7)–(4.9), (4.20), (4.25), (4.34), (4.37)–(4.39) and the
Cauchy–Schwarz inequality yields that there exists a constant C(2) > 0 such
that
EBJ23 ≤C(2)zn−1/4(lnn)3/4(4.40)
and both C˜ and C(2) can be estimated explicitly from the above formulas.
Finally, estimating the left-hand side of (4.28) by means of (4.7), (4.8),
(4.25), (4.28), (4.29), (4.33), (4.40) and estimating the other two terms in
the right-hand side of (4.27) exactly in the same way, we obtain that
J2(ζ, η)≤C(3)zn−1/4(lnn)3/4(4.41)
for some C(3) > 0 independent of n, which together with (4.22)–(4.26) yields
(3.17), completing the proof of Lemma 3.2. 
Proof of Lemma 3.3. In order to prove Lemma 3.3, we write by (2.1),
(2.9) and (3.15) that, for any k, l= 1,2, . . . , n,
|tQB,n,θz (θ(n)k , θ(n)l )−QBz (θ(n)k , θ(n)l )|
≤ |RB,n,θz (θ(n)k , θ(n)l )−RBz (θ(n)k , θ(n)l )|(4.42)
≤ L((θ(n)n +1)J3),
where
J3 = sup
0≤t≤θ(n)n
|SB,θ,nt (z)− SBt (z)|.
Set
H
(n,l)
3 = max
1≤k≤l
sup
θ
(n)
k−1≤s≤t≤θ
(n)
k
(r(t− s) + κ|B∗t −B∗s |) and H(n)3 =H(n,n)3 .
Then by (2.4) and (3.14), similarly to (4.19),
J3 ≤ 2zerθ
(n)
n H
(n)
3 max
0≤k≤n
e
κB
θ
(n)
k +2zerθ
(n)
n I
H
(n)
3 >1
max
0≤k≤n
e
κB
θ
(n)
k .(4.43)
Since |Bt −Bs| ≤ |Bt −Bθ(n)
k−1
|+ |Bt −Bθ(n)
k−1
| and (a+ b)2m ≤ 22m−1(a2m +
b2m) for a, b≥ 0, m≥ 1/2, we obtain by (4.1), (4.5) and (4.9) that
EB |H(n)3 |2m ≤ 22m−1
∣∣∣∣r− κ22
∣∣∣∣2mEB max1≤k≤n|θ(n)k − θ(n)k−1|2m
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+24m−1κ2mEB max
1≤k≤n
sup
θ
(n)
k−1≤t≤θ
(n)
k
|Bt −Bθ(n)
k−1
|2m
≤ 22m−1
n∑
k=1
(∣∣∣∣r− κ22
∣∣∣∣2mEB |θ(n)k − θ(n)k−1|2m
(4.44)
+ 22mκ2mEB sup
θ
(n)
k−1≤t≤θ
(n)
k
|Bt −Bθ(n)
k−1
|2m
)
≤ 22m−1n
(∣∣∣∣r− κ22
∣∣∣∣2mEB(θ(n)1 )2m + 22mκ2mΛmEB(θ(n)1 )m
)
≤K(m)5 n−m+1,
where
K
(m)
5 = 2
2m−1e2bT b−(m+1)T T
m
(∣∣∣∣r− κ22
∣∣∣∣2m(2m)!b−mT Tm +22mκ2mΛmm!
)
.
This together with the Chebyshev inequality gives that, for any integers
m,n≥ 1,
PB{H(n)3 > 1} ≤K(m)5 n−m+1.(4.45)
Finally, by (4.8), (4.25), (4.42)–(4.45) and the Ho¨lder inequality, we obtain
the assertion of Lemma 3.3. 
Proof of Lemma 3.4. The proof of Lemma 3.4 starts similarly with
the estimate
|QBz (θ(n)k , θ(n)l )−QBz (θ(n)k ∧ T, θ(n)l ∧ T )| ≤EB(J4(k, l) + J5(k, l)),(4.46)
where by (2.2)–(2.4) and (2.8),
J4(k, l) = |e−rθ
(n)
k∧l − e−rθ(n)k∧l∧T |RBz (θ(n)k ∧ T, θ(n)l ∧ T )
(4.47)
≤ rL(T + 2)(F0(z) +∆0(z) + z +1)erT
(
|θ(n)n − T | sup
0≤t≤T
eκBt
)
and
J5(k, l)≤ |RBz (θ(n)k , θ(n)l )−RBz (θ(n)k ∧ T, θ(n)l ∧ T )|
(4.48)
≤ L
(
|θ(n)n − T |
(
1 + erθ
(n)
n sup
0≤t≤θ(n)n
eκBt
)
+ J51
)
with
J51 = max
0≤k≤n
sup
θ
(n)
k
∧T≤t≤θ(n)
k
|SBt (z)− SBθ(n)
k
∧T (z)|.
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Set
H
(n)
4 = max
0≤k≤n
sup
θ
(n)
k
∧T≤t≤θ(n)
k
(r(t− θ(n)k ∧ T ) + κ|B∗t −B∗θ(n)
k
∧T |).
By (2.4), similarly to (4.30) and (4.43), we obtain that
J51 ≤ zerTH(n)4 sup
0≤t≤T
eκBt
(4.49)
+ zI
H
(n)
4 >1
(
erθ
(n)
n sup
0≤t≤θ(n)n
eκBt + erT sup
0≤t≤T
eκBt
)
.
Observe that θ
(n)
k ∧T < θ(n)k if and only if T < θ(n)k and since k ≤ n, we have
in this case
[θ
(n)
k ∧ T, θ(n)k ]⊂ [T, θ(n)n ]⊂ [T, θ(n)n ∨ T ].
Hence,
H
(n)
4 ≤
(
r+
κ2
2
)
|θ(n)n − T |+ κ sup
T≤t≤θ(n)n ∨T
|Bt −BT |.(4.50)
By (4.7), (4.9) and the Cauchy–Schwarz inequality,
EB sup
T≤t≤θ(n)n ∨T
|Bt −BT |2 ≤ Λ1EB |θ(n)n − T | ≤Λ1TK1/22 n−1/2,
which together with (4.7) and (4.50) gives
EB |H(n)4 |2 ≤ 2
(
r+
κ2
2
)2
K2T 2n−1+ 2κ2Λ1TK
1/2
2 n
−1/2.
This enables us to estimate PB{H(n)4 > 1} by the Chebyshev inequality and
together with (4.8), (4.25) and the Cauchy–Schwarz inequality yields
EBJ51 ≤C(4)zn−1/4
for some C(4) > 0 independent of n which can be easily estimated explic-
itly via the above formulas. Using (4.7), (4.8) and (4.25) together with the
Cauchy–Schwarz inequality in order to estimate EBJ4(ζ, η) and the expec-
tation of the remaining term in J5(ζ, η), we arrive at (3.19), completing the
proof of Lemma 3.4. 
Next, we derive Lemma 3.5 using estimates similar to the above.
Proof of Lemma 3.5. Namely, for any k, l= 1,2, . . . , we have
|RBz (θ(n)k ∧ T, θ(n)l ∧ T )−RBz (θ(n)k∧n ∧ T, θ(n)l∧n ∧ T )|
(4.51)
≤EB(J6(k, l) + J7(k, l)),
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where by (2.2)–(2.4), (2.9) and the equality θ
(n)
ζ ∧ θ(n)η = θ(n)ζ∧η similarly to
(4.43) and (4.49),
J6(k, l) = (|e−rθ
(n)
k∧l∧T − e−rθ(n)k∧l∧n∧T |RBz (θ(n)k ∧ T, θ(n)l ∧ T ))
≤ rL(T +2)(F0(z) +∆0(z) + z +1)erT(4.52)
× max
n<k<∞
|θ(n)k ∧ T − θ(n)n ∧ T | sup
0≤t≤T
eκBt
and
J7(k, l)≤ |RBz (θ(n)k ∧ T, θ(n)l ∧ T )−RBz (θ(n)k∧n ∧ T, θ(n)l∧n ∧ T )|
≤ LzerT
((
1 + sup
0≤t≤T
eκBt
)
(4.53)
×
(
max
n<k<∞
|θ(n)k ∧ T − θ(n)n ∧ T |+H(n)5 +2IH(n)5 >1
))
,
with
H
(n)
5 = max
n<k<∞
sup
θ
(n)
n ∧T≤t≤θ(n)k ∧T
(r(t− θ(n)n ∧ T ) + κ|B∗t −B∗θ(n)n ∧T |).
Observe that θ
(n)
n ∧ T < θ(n)k ∧ T for k > n if and only if T > θ(n)n and then
[θ(n)n ∧ T, θ(n)k ∧ T ]⊂ [θ(n)n , T ]⊂ [θ(n)n , θ(n)n ∨ T ].
Hence,
|θ(n)k ∧ T − θ(n)n ∧ T | ≤ T ∨ θ(n)n − θ(n)n
(4.54)
≤ |T − θ(n)n |
and
H
(n)
5 ≤
(
r+
κ2
2
)
|T − θ(n)n |+ κ sup
T≤t≤θ(n)n ∨T
|Bt −BT |.(4.55)
The right-hand side of (4.55) is the same as in (4.50), and so we can use the
same estimates for H
(n)
5 as for H
(n)
4 , which together with (4.7), (4.8), (4.25),
the Chebyshev and the Cauchy–Schwarz inequalities enable us to estimate
EBJ7(k, l) by C
(5)zn−1/4 for some C(5) > 0 independent of n. Finally, using
(4.7), (4.8), (4.25) and (4.54) together with the Cauchy–Schwarz inequality
in order to estimate EBJ6(k, l), we obtain (3.20), completing the proof of
Lemma 3.5. 
In order to complete the proof of Theorem 2.1, it remains to establish
Lemma 3.6.
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Proof of Lemma 3.6. For each σ ∈ T B0,T , set νσ =min{k ∈N : θ(n)k ≥ σ}
which, indeed, defines νσ since θ
(n)
k →∞ with probability one as k→∞.
Observe that νσ ∈ T B,n since {νσ ≤ k} = {θ(n)k ≥ σ} ∈ FBθ(n)
k
. For any σ ∈
T B0,T , we set σ(n) = θ(n)νσ ∧T . Since T B,nT ⊂ T B0,T , we conclude from (2.10) that
V (z)≥ inf
σ∈T B
0,T
sup
τ∈T B,nT
EBQBz (σ, τ).(4.56)
Then for any δ > 0, there exists σδ ∈ T B0,T such that
V (z)≥ sup
τ∈T B,nT
EBQBz (σδ, τ)− δ.(4.57)
This together with (3.21) implies
V (z)≥ sup
τ∈T B,nT
EBQBz (σ
(n)
δ , τ)− δ
− sup
τ∈T B,nT
EB(QBz (σ
(n)
δ , τ)−QBz (σδ, τ))(4.58)
≥ V B,n0,T − δ− sup
τ∈T B,n
T
J8(σδ, τ)− sup
τ∈T B,n
T
J9(σδ, τ),
where, for any σ ∈ T B0,T and τ ∈ T B,nT ,
J8(σ, τ) =E
B(e−rσ
(n)∧τ (RBz (σ
(n), τ)−RBz (σ, τ)))
and by (2.3)–(2.4),
J9(σ, τ) =E
B(|e−rσ(n)∧τ − e−rσ∧τ |RBz (σ, τ))
≤ rL(T + 2)(F0(z) +∆0(z) + z)erT(4.59)
×EB
(
sup
0≤k<∞
|θ(n)k+1 ∧ T − θ(n)k ∧ T |
(
1 + sup
0≤t≤T
eκBt
))
.
Since σ(n) ≥ σ, it follows that
RBz (σ, τ) = Fσ(S
B(z)) +∆σ(S
B(z))
whenever
RBz (σ
(n), τ) = Fσ(n)(S
B(z)) +∆σ(n)(S
B(z)).
Thus, by (2.2) and (2.8), similarly to (4.53) for any σ ∈ T B0T and τ ∈ T B,nT ,
RBz (σ
(n), τ)−RBz (σ, τ)
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≤ |Fσ(n)(SB(z))−Fσ(SB(z))|+ |∆σ(n)(SB(z))−∆σ(SB(z))|
(4.60)
≤ LzerT
(
1 + sup
0≤t≤T
eκBt
)
×
(
sup
0≤k<∞
|θ(n)k+1 ∧ T − θ(n)k ∧ T |+H(n)6 +2IH(n)6 >1
)
,
where
H
(n)
6 = sup
0≤k<∞
sup
θ
(n)
k
∧T≤t≤θ(n)
k+1
∧T
(r(t− θ(n)k ∧ T ) + κ(B∗t −B∗θ(n)
k
∧T )).
It is clear that
|H(n)6 | ≤ |H(n)3 |+ |H(n)5 |(4.61)
and by (4.54), for all k ≥ 0,
|θ(n)k+1 ∧ T − θ(n)k ∧ T | ≤ max0≤k≤n−1|θ
(n)
k+1− θ(n)k |+ |T − θ(n)n |.(4.62)
Hence, we can apply to the right-hand side of (4.60) the estimates of Lemmas
3.3 and 3.5 arriving at a bound of order n−1/4. In order to obtain a better
estimate promised in Lemma 3.6 (though it will not help us to improve the
estimate of Theorem 2.1), we write
|H(n)6 | ≤ |H(n,2n)3 |+ Iθ(n)2n <T (|H
(n)
3 |+ |H(n)5 |),(4.63)
with H
(n,l)
3 defined above (4.43). In the same way as in (4.44), we obtain
EB |H(n,2n)3 |2m ≤ 2K(m)5 n−m+1.(4.64)
Next, by (4.1) and (4.4), similarly to (4.17), (4.18) and (4.39), we obtain the
following (large deviations) upper bound:
PB{θ(n)2n < T}= PB{2nαn −Ψ2n >n(2αn − 1)} ≤ C˜e−ρn(4.65)
for all n ∈N and some C˜, ρ > 0 independent of n. Estimating EB |T − θ(n)n |m
by (4.7), we obtain by (4.9), (4.44), (4.55), (4.63)–(4.65) and the Cauchy–
Schwarz inequality that, for any m≥ 1, there exists K(m)6 > 0 (which can be
explicitly estimated from above formulas) such that
EB |H(n)6 |2m ≤K(m)6 n−m+1.(4.66)
Since δ in (4.58) is arbitrary, we conclude by (4.7), (4.8), (4.25), (4.55),
(4.58)–(4.60), (4.62) and (4.66) together with the Chebyshev and Ho¨lder
inequalities similarly to Lemma 3.3 that, for any ε > 0, there exists C
(6)
ε > 0
such that, for all n ∈N,
V (z)− V B,n0,T (z)≥−C(6)ε (F0(z) +∆0(z) + z +1)nε−1/2.(4.67)
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By [23], we can represent V (z) not only in the form (2.10), but also as
V (z) = sup
τ∈T B
0T
inf
σ∈T B0T
EBQBz (σ, τ)
≤ inf
σ∈T B,nT
EBQBz (σ, τδ) + δ
for each δ > 0 and some τδ ∈ T B0T . Introducing τ (n)δ and employing the same
arguments as above, we obtain that, for any ε > 0, there exists C
(7)
ε > 0 such
that, for all n ∈N,
V (z)− V B,n0,T (z)≤C(7)ε (F0(z) +∆0(z) + z +1)nε−1/2,
which together with (4.67) yields (3.23) and completes the proof of both
Lemma 3.6 and Theorem 2.1. 
5. Exercise times and hedging with small shortfalls. Set
V (n)(z, η) = min
ζ∈T ξ0n
EξnQ
(n)
z
(
ζT
n
,
ηT
n
)
,
(5.1)
V
(n)
(z, ζ) = max
η∈T ξ0n
EξnQ
(n)
z
(
ζT
n
,
ηT
n
)
,
V B,n(z, η) = inf
ζ∈T B,n0,n
EBQB,nz
(
ζT
n
,
ηT
n
)
,
(5.2)
V
B,n
(z, ζ) = sup
η∈T B,n0,n
EBQB,nz
(
ζT
n
,
ηT
n
)
and
V B,nS (z, η) = min
ζ∈SB,n0,n
EBQB,nz
(
ζT
n
,
ηT
n
)
,
(5.3)
V
B,n
S (z, ζ) = max
η∈SB,n0,n
EBQB,nz
(
ζT
n
,
ηT
n
)
.
We define similar quantities Vˆ
(n)
, Vˆ
(n)
, Vˆ
B,n
, Vˆ
B,n
, Vˆ
B,n
S , Vˆ
B,n
S replacingQ
(n)
z
by Qˆ
(n)
z and QB,nz by Qˆ
B,n
z in the corresponding formulas.
Proof of Theorem 2.2. The starting point in the proof of Theorem
2.2 is the following result similar to Lemma 3.1.
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Lemma 5.1. For any z,n > 0 and each µ ∈ J0n,
V B,nS (z,µ ◦ λ(n)B ) = V (n)(z,µ ◦ λ(n)ξ ) = V B,n(z,µ ◦ λ(n)B )(5.4)
and
V
B,n
S (z,µ ◦ λ(n)B ) = V
(n)
(z,µ ◦ λ(n)ξ ) = V
B,n
(z,µ ◦ λ(n)B ).(5.5)
The corresponding results hold true also for Vˆ
(n)
, Vˆ
(n)
, Vˆ
B,n
, Vˆ
B,n
, Vˆ
B,n
S , Vˆ
B,n
S
in place of V (n), V
(n)
, V B,n, V
B,n
, V B,nS , V
B,n
S , respectively.
Proof. The first equality in (5.4) and (5.5) follows in the same way as
the first equality in (3.5), taking into account that
Q(n)z (µ ◦ λ(n)ξ , ν ◦ λ(n)ξ ) and QB,nz (µ ◦ λ(n)B , ν ◦ λ(n)B )
have the same distribution for all µ, ν ∈ J0n. In order to obtain the second
equality in (5.4) and (5.5), we employ again the well-known dynamical pro-
gramming recursive relations for the optimal stopping problem (see, e.g.,
[26]) which have here the form
V (n)(z, η) = V
(n)
0,n(z, η), V
(n)
n,n(z, η) =Q
(n)
z
(
T,
ηT
n
)
and
(5.6)
V
(n)
k,n(z, η) = min
(
Q(n)z
(
kT
n
,
ηT
n
)
,Eξ(V
(n)
k+1,n(z, η)|Fξk )
)
,
V
(n)
(z, ζ) = V
(n)
0,n(z, ζ), V
(n)
n,n(z, ζ) =Q
(n)
z
(
ζT
n
,T
)
and
(5.7)
V
(n)
k,n(z, η) = max
(
Q(n)z
(
ζT
n
,
kT
n
)
,Eξ(V
(n)
k+1,n(z, ζ)|Fξk )
)
for any ζ, η ∈ T ξ0n and
V B,n(z, η) = V B,n0,n (z, η), V
B,n
n,n (z, η) =Q
B,n
z
(
T,
ηT
n
)
and
(5.8)
V B,nk,n (z, η) = min
(
QB,nz
(
kTn,
ηT
n
)
,EB(V B,nk+1,n(z, η)|FBθ(n)
k
)
)
,
V
B,n
(z, ζ) = V
B,n
0,n (z, ζ), V
B,n
n,n (z, ζ) =Q
B,n
z
(
ζT
n
,T
)
and
(5.9)
V
B,n
k,n (z, η) = max
(
QB,nz
(
ζT
n
,
kT
n
)
,EB(V B,nk+1,n(z, ζ)|FBθ(n)
k
)
)
for any ζ, η ∈ T ξ0n.
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It is clear from the construction of the stopping times µ◦λ(n)ξ and µ◦λ(n)B
for µ ∈ J0n that (µ ◦ λ(n)ξ ) ∧ k, Iµ◦λ(n)
ξ
≥k and (µ ◦ λ
(n)
B ) ∧ k, Iµ◦λ(n)B ≥k are
measurable with respect to the σ-algebras Fξk and GB,nk , respectively. Since
Fk(S
(n)), ∆k(S
(n)) and Fk(S
B), ∆k(S
B) are also Fξk - and GB,nk -measurable,
respectively, we conclude that Q
(n)
z (
kT
n ,
T
nµ ◦ λ
(n)
ξ ), Q
(n)
z (
T
nµ ◦ λ
(n)
ξ ,
kT
n ) and
QB,nz (
kT
n ,
T
nµ ◦ λ
(n)
B ), Q
B,n
z (
T
nµ ◦ λ
(n)
B ,
kT
n ) are Fξk - and GB,nk -measurable, re-
spectively. It follows from here by the backward induction in the same way as
in Lemma 3.1 that there exist measurable functions Φµk(z,x1, . . . , xk), Φ
µ
0 (z)
and Φ
µ
k(z,x1, . . . , xk), Φ
µ
0 (z), k = 1,2, . . . , n, such that
V
(n)
kn (z,µ ◦ λ(k)ξ ) = Φµk
(
z,
(
T
n
)1/2
ξ1, . . . ,
(
T
n
)1/2
ξk
)
,
(5.10)
V
(n)
0n (z,µ ◦ λ(n)ξ ) = Φµ0 (z),
V
(n)
kn (z,µ ◦ λ(k)ξ ) = Φ
µ
k
(
z,
(
T
n
)1/2
ξ1, . . . ,
(
T
n
)1/2
ξk
)
(5.11)
V
(n)
0n (z,µ ◦ λ(n)ξ ) = Φ
µ
0 (z)
and
V B,nkn (z,µ ◦ λ(k)B ) = Φµk(z,B∗θ(n)1 ,B
∗
θ
(n)
2
−B∗
θ
(n)
1
, . . . ,B∗
θ
(n)
k
−B∗
θ
(n)
k−1
),
(5.12)
V B,n0n (z,µ ◦ λ(n)B ) = Φµ0 (z),
V
B,n
kn (z,µ ◦ λ(k)B ) = Φ
µ
k(z,B
∗
θ
(n)
1
,B∗
θ
(n)
2
−B∗
θ
(n)
1
, . . . ,B∗
θ
(n)
k
−B∗
θ
(n)
k−1
),
(5.13)
V
B,n
0n (z,µ ◦ λ(n)B ) = Φ
µ
0 (z).
Applying these formulas for k = 0, we obtain the second equality in (5.4)
and (5.5). The corresponding results for Vˆ
(n)
, Vˆ
(n)
, Vˆ
B,n
, Vˆ
B,n
, Vˆ
B,n
S , Vˆ
B,n
S
are derived in the same way. 
Define
V B,n0,T (z, τ) = inf
σ∈T B,nT
EBQBz (σ, τ) and
(5.14)
V
B,n
0,T (z,σ) = sup
τ∈T B,nT
EBQBz (σ, τ).
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The proof of Lemma 3.2, together with Lemmas 3.3–3.5, yields that there
exists C(8) > 0 such that, for each µ ∈ J0n and all z,n > 0,
|V B,n(z,µ ◦ λ(n)B )− V B,n0,T (z, θ(n)µ◦λ(n)B
∧ T )|
(5.15)
≤C(8)(F0(z) +∆0(z) + z + 1)n−1/4(lnn)3/4
and
|V B,n(z,µ ◦ λ(n)B )− V
B,n
0,T (z, θ
(n)
µ◦λ(n)B
∧ T )|
(5.16)
≤C(8)(F0(z) +∆0(z) + z +1)n−1/4(lnn)3/4.
Next, set
V (z, τ) = inf
σ∈T B0T
EBQBz (σ, τ), V (z,σ) = sup
τ∈T B
0T
EBQBz (σ, τ),(5.17)
and similarly to Lemma 3.6, estimate |V B,n0,T (z, τ)−V (z, τ)| and |V
B,n
0,T (z, τ)−
V (z, τ)|, but now it is a bit simpler since we have obvious one-sided inequal-
ities
V B,n0,T (z, τ)≥ V (z, τ) and V
B,n
0,T (z, τ)≤ V (z, τ).(5.18)
For any τ ∈ T B,nT and δ > 0, there exists σδ ∈ T B0,T such that
V (z, τ) =EBQBz (σδ, τ)− δ,
and so using the notation J8 and J9 from (4.58) together with their esti-
mates, we see that, for any ε > 0, there exists C
(9)
ε > 0 such that, for any
δ > 0 and n ∈N,
V (z, τ) =EBQBz (σ
(n)
δ , τ)− δ − J8(σδ, τ)− J9(σδ, τ)
≥ V B,n0,T (z, τ)− δ −C(9)ε nε−1/2.
Since δ is arbitrary and we have already inequality (5.18) in the other di-
rection, it follows that
|V (z, τ)− V B,n0,T (z, τ)| ≤C(9)ε nε−1/2.(5.19)
Similarly, we obtain that
|V (z, τ)− V B,n0,T (z, τ)| ≤C(9)ε nε−1/2.(5.20)
Finally, (5.4), (5.5), (5.10)–(5.13), (5.19) and (5.20) together with (2.13)
yield (2.17), provided (2.16) holds true. The proof is similar for λˆ
(n)
ξ , λˆ
(n)
B ,
Qˆ
(n)
z , Vˆ (n)(z) in place of λ
(n)
ξ , λ
(n)
B , Q
(n)
z , V (n)(z). 
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Next, we establish Theorem 2.3.
Proof of Theorem 2.3. Since βk = β
ζ
k and γk = γ
ζ
k in (2.19) are
Fk−1-measurable, they can be written uniquely in the form βk = fk ◦ λ(l)ξ
and γk = gk ◦ λ(l)ξ for any l= k− 1, k, . . . , n, where fk and gk are considered
as functions on {−1,1}n depending only on first k − 1 variables, that is, in
fact, as functions on {−1,1}k−1.
In order to show that the portfolio ZBt defined by (2.21) is self-financing,
it suffices to check that the discounted portfolio
ZˇBt = Z
B
t b
−1
t = β
ϕ
t b0 + γ
ϕ
t Sˇ
B
t , Sˇ
B
t = S
B
t e
−rt(5.21)
is self-financing, which means in our case that, with probability one,
(fk+1 − fk) ◦ λ(k)B b0 + (gk+1 − gk) ◦ λ(k)B SˇBθ(n)
k
= 0,(5.22)
where, recall, βϕt = fk ◦ λ(k−1)B = fk ◦ λ(k)B and γϕt = gk ◦ λ(k−1)B = gk ◦ λ(k)B
whenever t ∈ (θ(n)k−1, θ(n)k ]. But if λ(k)B (ω) = λ(k)ξ (ω′), then
(fk+1− fk) ◦ λ(k)B (ω)b0 + (gk+1 − gk) ◦ λ(k)B (ω)SˇBθ(n)
k
(ω)
(z,ω)
(5.23)
= (fk+1 − fk) ◦ λ(k)ξ (ω′)b0 + (gk+1 − gk) ◦ λ(k)ξ (ω′)Sˇ(n)kT/n(z,ω′),
where Sˇ
(n)
kT/n(z) = S
(n)
kT/n(z)e
−rkT /n. By (2.19), the right-hand side in (5.23)
equals zero, and so (5.22) follows.
Recall that the sequence B∗
θ
(n)
k
−B∗
θ
(n)
k−1
, k = 1,2, . . . , has the same distribu-
tion as the sequence (Tn )
1/2ξk, k = 1,2, . . . . Since the processes S
B,n
t (z), t≥ 0,
and S
(n)
t (z), t≥ 0, defined by (3.1) and (2.5), respectively, are obtained by
the same formulas from these sequences, they have the same distribution as
well. Moreover, if µ ∈ J0n, ζ = µ ◦ λ(n)ξ , and ϕ= µ ◦ λ(n)B , then the sequences
QB,nz
(
ϕT
n
,
kT
n
)
− ZˇB
θ
(n)
ϕ∧k
, k = 0,1, . . . , n,
and
Q(n)z
(
ζT
n
,
kT
n
)
− Zˇπζ ,nζ∧k , k = 0,1, . . . , n,
are obtained by means of the same functional from the sequences
B∗
θ
(n)
k
−B∗
θ
(n)
k−1
, k = 1,2, . . . , and
(
T
n
)1/2
ξk, k = 1,2, . . . ,
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respectively. This together with (2.20) yields that
EB max
0≤k≤n
(
QB,nz
(
ϕT
n
,
kT
n
)
− ZˇB
θ
(n)
ϕ ∧θ(n)k
)+
= 0.(5.24)
In order to estimate the left-hand side of (2.22), we observe that
(RBz (θ
(n)
ϕ , t)−ZBθ(n)ϕ ∧t)
+ ≤ erT (QBz (θ(n)ϕ , t)− ZˇBθ(n)ϕ ∧t)
+(5.25)
and in view of (5.24),
(QBz (θ
(n)
ϕ , t)− ZˇBθ(n)ϕ ∧t)
+ ≤ (QBz (θ(n)ϕ , t)−QBz (θ(n)ϕ , θ(n)νt ))+
+
(
QBz (θ
(n)
ϕ , θ
(n)
νt )−QB,nz
(
ϕT
n
,
νtT
n
))+
(5.26)
+ (ZˇB
θ
(n)
ϕ ∧θ(n)νt
− ZˇB
θ
(n)
ϕ ∧t
)+IAt ,
where we introduce the event At = {QBz (θ(n)ϕ , t)≥ ZˇBθ(n)ϕ ∧t} and, again, νt =
min{k ∈N : θ(n)k ≥ t}. Note that since ϕ≤ n,
QBz (θ
(n)
ϕ , θ
(n)
νt ) =Q
B
z (θ
(n)
ϕ , θ
(n)
νt∧n),
(5.27)
QB,nz
(
ϕT
n
,
νtT
n
)
=QB,nz
(
ϕT
n
, (νt ∧ n)T
n
)
and
QBz (θ
(n)
ϕ ∧ T, θ(n)νt ∧ T ) =QBz (θ(n)ϕ ∧ T, θ
(n)
νt∧n ∧ T ).(5.28)
Taking into account (5.27) and (5.28), we obtain by the same estimates as
in Lemma 3.4 that there exists C(10) > 0 such that, for all z,n > 0,
EB sup
0≤t≤T
|QBz (θ(n)ϕ , t)−QBz (θ(n)ϕ ∧ T, t)|
(5.29)
≤C(10)(F0(z) +∆0(z) + z +1)n−1/4
and
EB sup
0≤t≤T
|QBz (θ(n)ϕ , θ(n)νt∧n)−QBz (θ(n)ϕ ∧ T, θ(n)νt∧n ∧ T )|
(5.30)
≤C(10)(F0(z) +∆0(z) + z + 1)n−1/4.
Similarly to the estimates in the proof of Lemma 3.6, we obtain that, for
any ε > 0, there exists C
(11)
ε > 0 such that, for all z,n > 0,
EB sup
0≤t≤T
(QBz (θ
(n)
ϕ ∧ T, t)−QBz (θ(n)ϕ ∧ T, θ(n)νt ∧ T ))+
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≤EB sup
0≤t≤T
(|e−θ(n)ϕ ∧t − e−θ(n)ϕ∧νt∧T |Ft(SB(z)))
(5.31)
+EB sup
0≤t≤T
|Ft(SB(z))−Fθ(n)νt ∧T (S
B(z))|
≤C(11)ε nε−1/2.
Taking into account (5.27), we obtain by estimates of Lemmas 3.2 and 3.5
that there exists C(12) > 0 such that, for all z,n > 0,
EB sup
0≤t≤T
(
QBz (θ
(n)
ϕ , θ
(n)
νt )−QB,nz
(
ϕT
n
,
νtT
n
))+
(5.32)
≤C(12)(F0(z) +∆0(z) + z + 1)n−1/4(lnn)3/4.
By the definition, βϕs = β
ϕ
θ
(n)
νs
and γϕs = γ
ϕ
θ
(n)
νs
, and so
(ZˇB
θ
(n)
ϕ ∧θ(n)νt
− ZˇB
θ
(n)
ϕ ∧t
)+IAt
≤ γϕ
θ
(n)
ϕ ∧t
(SˇB
θ
(n)
ϕ ∧θ(n)νt
(z)− SˇB
θ
(n)
ϕ ∧t
(z))+
≤ γϕ
θ
(n)
ϕ ∧t
SˇB
θ
(n)
ϕ ∧t
(z)IAt(exp(κ(B
∗
θ
(n)
ϕ ∧θ(n)νt
−B∗
θ
(n)
ϕ ∧t
))− 1)+(5.33)
≤QBz (θ(n)ϕ , t)
×
(
H
(n)
3 + IH(n)3 >1
(
1 + erθ
(n)
n sup
0≤s≤θ(n)n
eκBs sup
0≤s≤T
e−κBs
))
,
with H
(n)
3 defined before (4.43). Since, by (2.3) and (2.4),
sup
0≤t≤T
QBz (θ
(n)
ϕ , t)≤ F0(z) +∆0(z) +L(T + 2)
(
1 + zerT sup
0≤t≤T
eκBs
)
,
we derive from (4.8), (4.44), (4.45), (5.33) and the Ho¨lder inequality that,
for any ε > 0, there exists C
(13)
ε > 0 such that, for all z,n > 0,
EB sup
0≤t≤T
(ZˇB
θ
(n)
ϕ ∧θ(n)νt
− ZˇB
θ
(n)
ϕ ∧t
)+IAt
(5.34)
≤C(13)ε (F0(z) +∆0(z) + z +1)nε−1/2,
which together with (5.25), (5.26) and (5.29)–(5.32) yields (2.22), completing
the proof of Theorem 2.3. 
6. Estimates a´ la Lamberton and Rogers. In this section we derive a
game option version of the approximation error estimates from [24] whose
boundedness and smoothness assumptions do not permit to employ them
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even for standard options, but this explicit and simple method still has cer-
tain theoretical and pedagogical value. Let ξ1, ξ2, . . . be i.i.d. random vari-
ables on a probability space (Ωξ, P ξ) with Eξξ1 = 0, E
ξξ21 = 1 and E
ξξ41 <∞.
The latter ensures that if Θ is the Skorokhod embedding time of ξ1 into the
Brownian motion Bt (i.e., a stopping time such that ξ1 and BΘ have the
same distribution), then VarΘ =E(Θ− 1)2 <∞ (see [4] or [24]). We will
use the same notation as in Section 2 for Ξ
(n)
k given by (2.17) and for the
corresponding sets of stopping times T B0T and T ξ0n with respect to the Brow-
nian filtration FBt with values in [0, T ] and with respect to the filtration Fξk
generated by ξ1, ξ2, . . . with values in {1, . . . , n}, respectively. Let g ≥ f be
continuous bounded functions on [0, T ]×R and
R(s, t, x) = g(s,x)Is<t + f(t, x)It≤s.
Set
V = inf
σ∈T B0,T
sup
τ∈T B
0,T
EBR(σ, τ,Bσ∧τ ),(6.1)
where, recall, Bt, t≥ 0,B0 = 0 is the standard one-dimensional continuous
in time Brownian motion, and
V (n) = inf
ζ∈T ξ0,n
sup
η∈T ξ0,n
EξR
(
ζT
n
,
ηT
n
,Ξ
(n)
ζ∧η
)
.(6.2)
Theorem 6.1. Let f, g :R+×R→R be bounded, continuous and having
bounded and continuous derivatives ∂f∂t ,
∂g
∂t ,
∂2f
∂x2 and
∂2g
∂x2 functions. Let
Lh=
∂h
∂t
+
1
2
∂2h
∂x2
and ρ=
√
VarΘ. Then
|V − V (n)| ≤ ρT√
n
(
3‖Lf‖∞ + 3‖Lg‖∞ +
∥∥∥∥∂f∂t
∥∥∥∥∞ +
∥∥∥∥∂g∂t
∥∥∥∥∞
)
(6.3)
+
T
n
(‖Lf‖∞ + ‖Lg‖∞),
where ‖ · ‖∞ is the supremum norm on the whole R+×R.
Proof. As in Section 2, we employ the Skorokhod embedding (see,
e.g., [4]) which yields the existence of a nondecreasing sequence of stopping
times θ
(n)
k , k = 1,2, . . . , θ
(n)
0 = 0 for the Brownian motion Bt with its Brown-
ian filtration FBt , t≥ 0, such that (θ(n)k+1− θ(n)k ,Bθ(n)
k+1
−B
θ
(n)
k
) is independent
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of FB
θ
(n)
k
and it has the same distribution as (Θn T,BΘ
√
T
n ). Let T B,n be the
set of integer valued stopping times with respect to the filtration {FB
θ
(n)
k
}k∈N
and the subset of these stopping times with values in {0,1, . . . , n} we denote
by T B,n0,n . We claim that
V (n) = V B,n = inf
ζ∈T B,n0,n
sup
η∈T B,n0,n
EBR
(
ζT
n
,
ηT
n
,B
θ
(n)
ζ
∧θ(n)η
)
.(6.4)
Indeed, this result can be proved similarly to Lemma 3.1 employing the
corresponding dynamical programming recursive formulas. Namely, we can
write V (n) = V
(n)
0,n , V
(n)
n,n = f(T,Ξ
(n)
n ) and for k = 0,1, . . . , n− 1,
V
(n)
k,n =min
(
g
(
kT
n
,Ξ
(n)
k
)
,max
(
f
(
kT
n
,Ξ
(n)
k
)
,Eξ(V
(n)
k+1,n|Fξk )
))
and, on the other hand, V B,n = V B,n0,n , V
B,n
n,n = f(T,BT ) and for k = 0,1, . . . ,
n− 1,
V B,nk,n =min
(
g
(
kT
n
,B
θ
(n)
k
)
,max
(
f
(
kT
n
,B
θ
(n)
k
)
,EB(V B,nk+1,n|FBθ(n)
k
)
))
.
In the same way as in Lemma 3.1, we show by the backward induction that
there exist a sequence Qk(x1, . . . , xk), k = 1, . . . , n, of measurable functions
and a constant Q0 such that V
(n)
0,n =Q0, V
B,n
0,n =Q0 and V
(n)
k,n =Qk((
T
n)
1/2ξ1,
. . . ,(Tn)
1/2ξk), V
B,n
kn =Qk(Bθ(n)1
,B
θ
(n)
2
−B
θ
(n)
1
, . . . ,B
θ
(n)
k
−B
θ
(n)
k−1
) for k = 1, . . . , n,
and so (6.4) follows.
Next, set
V B,θ,n = inf
ζ∈T B,n0,n
sup
η∈T B,n0,n
EBR(θ
(n)
ζ , θ
(n)
η ,Bθ(n)
ζ
∧θ(n)η ).(6.5)
Then
|V B,n − V B,θ,n|
≤ sup
ζ∈T B,n0,n
sup
η∈T B,n0,n
EB
∣∣∣∣R(θ(n)ζ , θ(n)η ,Bθ(n)
ζ
∧θ(n)η )
(6.6)
−R
(
ζT
n
,
ηT
n
,B
θ
(n)
ζ
∧θ(n)η
)∣∣∣∣
≤
(∥∥∥∥∂f∂t
∥∥∥∥∞ +
∥∥∥∥∂g∂t
∥∥∥∥∞
)
sup
ζ∈T B,n0,n
EB
∣∣∣∣θ(n)ζ − ζTn
∣∣∣∣.
BINOMIAL APPROXIMATIONS OF GAME OPTIONS 49
Since θ
(n)
k − kTn , k = 0,1, . . . , n, is a martingale with respect to the filtration
FB
θ
(n)
k
, k ≥ 0, the sequence |θ(n)k − kTn |, k = 0,1, . . . , n, is a submartingale
which together with the Cauchy–Schwarz inequality yields
sup
ζ∈T B,n0,n
EB
∣∣∣∣θ(n)ζ − ζTn
∣∣∣∣≤EB |θ(n)n − T |
(6.7)
≤ (EB(θ(n)n − T )2)1/2 =
ρT√
n
.
Next, let T B,nT = {θ(n)ζ ∧ T : ζ ∈ T B,n0,n } and set
V B,n0,T = inf
σ∈T B,n
T
sup
τ∈T B,nT
EB(e−rσ∧τR(σ, τ)).(6.8)
By the Itoˆ formula (see [11]), we arrive at the Dynkin formula, which gives
|V B,θ,n − V B,n0,T |
≤ sup
ζ∈T B,n0,n
sup
η∈T B,n0,n
∣∣∣∣EB
(
R(θ
(n)
ζ , θ
(n)
η ,Bθ(n)
ζ
∧θ(n)η )
−R(θ(n)ζ ∧ T, θ(n)η ∧ T,Bθ(n)
ζ
∧θ(n)η ∧T )
)∣∣∣∣
(6.9)
≤ sup
ζ∈T B,n0,n
(∣∣∣∣EB
∫ θ(n)
ζ
θ
(n)
ζ
∧T
Lf(s,Bs)ds
∣∣∣∣+
∣∣∣∣EB
∫ θ(n)
ζ
θ
(n)
ζ
∧T
Lg(s,Bs)ds
∣∣∣∣
)
≤ (‖Lf‖∞ + ‖Lg‖∞)EB |θ(n)n − T |
≤ ρ
√
T
n
(‖Lf‖∞ + ‖Lg‖∞).
In order to obtain (6.3), it remains to show that
|V − V B,n0,T | ≤
(
T
n
+2
ρT√
n
)
(‖Lf‖∞ + ‖Lg‖∞).(6.10)
As in the proof of Lemma 3.6 in Section 4, for each σ ∈ T B0,T , define νσ =
min{k ∈ N : θ(n)k ≥ σ} and σ(n) = θ(n)νσ ∧ T . Similarly to (4.58), we conclude
that, for any δ > 0, there exists σδ ∈ T B0,T such that
V ≥ V B,n0,T − δ− sup
τ∈T B,n
T
EB(R(σ
(n)
δ , τ,Bσ(n)
δ
∧τ )−R(σδ, τ,Bσδ∧τ ))
≥ V B,n0,T − δ− sup
σ∈T B0,T
|EB(g(σ(n),Bσ(n))− g(σ,Bσ))|
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(6.11)
− sup
τ∈T B0,T
|EB(f(τ (n),Bτ (n))− g(τ,Bτ ))|
≥ V B,n0,T − δ− (‖Lf‖∞ + ‖Lg‖∞) sup
σ∈T B0,T
EB |σ(n) − σ|,
where we used also the Itoˆ formula and took into account in the same way
as in (4.60) that σ(n) ≥ σ. By (4.62), for any σ ∈ T B0,T ,
|σ(n) − σ| ≤ max
0≤k≤n−1
|θ(n)k+1− θ(n)k |+ |T − θ(n)n |,
and so employing the estimate
E max
0≤k≤n−1
Zk ≤EZ0 +
√
nVarZ0
from Lemma 3.5 of [24] to the i.i.d. random variables Zk = θ
(n)
k+1 − θ(n)k , we
obtain from (4.1) and (6.7) that
EB |σ(n) − σ| ≤ T
n
+2
Tρ√
n
.(6.12)
Taking into account that δ in (6.11) can be taken arbitrarily small, we obtain
from (6.11) and (6.12) that
V − V B,n0,T ≥−
(
T
n
+2
Tρ√
n
)
(‖Lf‖∞ + ‖Lg‖∞).(6.13)
By [23], we can write also that
V = sup
τ∈T B
0,T
inf
σ∈T B0,T
EBR(σ, τ,Bσ∧τ )
≤ V B,n0,T + δ + sup
σ∈T B,nT
(R(σ, τδ,Bσ∧τδ )−R(σ, τ (n)δ ,Bσ∧τ (n)
δ
))
and similarly to the above, we obtain that
V − V B,n0,T ≤
(
T
n
+ 2
Tρ√
n
)
(‖Lf‖∞ + ‖Lg‖∞),
which together with (6.13) gives (6.10) and completes the proof of Theorem
6.1. 
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